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FETAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS: THE TRIUMPH OF
REACTION OVER REASON
Michelle D. Mills
INTRODUCTION
The use and abuse of increasingly dangerous illicit drugs' has risen
dramatically in recent years, creating a nationwide "war on drugs." 2
Pregnant women are not immune to the allure of these substances;
approximately eleven percent of pregnant women ingest some type of
illegal drug during their pregnancies.3 Although studies do not agree
on a figure, as many as 100,000 to 375,000 infants each year are born
after being exposed to some type of drug in the womb.4 This trend
1. The term "illicit drugs" includes all manner of statutorily-defined controlled substances.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-12 (West 1981 & Supp. 1997).
2. Stephen R. Kandall & Wendy Chavkin, Illicit Drugs in America: History, Impact on Women
and Infants, and Treatment Strategies for Women, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 615, 615 (1992).
3. Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Note, Punitive Policies: Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consen-
sual Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 443-44 (1995) (citing a
1990 survey of public and private hospitals performed by the American Academy of Pediatrics,
which found that 11% of new mothers used controlled substances during their pregnancies).
4. Nancy J. Bennett, Drug Exposed Newborns: Alternatives to Punitive Sanction of the
Mother-A Coordinated Response, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 182, 185 (1991). The 1989 National
Drug Control Strategy estimates that there are 100,000 cocaine-exposed newborns each year,
and the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education ("NAPARE")
claims 375,000 infants are born drug-exposed. Id. A survey of hospital discharges performed by
the National Center for Health Statistics found that less than 14,000 drug-exposed infants are
born each year. Id. The discrepancies result from the sample used in the survey and whether the
hospitals tested for multiple substances; higher numbers generally result when women and
newborns are universally tested for exposure to many different drugs. Id. The Center for Health
Statistics survey, for example, was conducted in hospitals that did not routinely test all women
and infants. Id; see also Judy Howard, Chronic Drug Users as Parents, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 647
(1992) (indicating that the 100,000 figure did not include prenatal exposure to heroin,
methamphetamine, or phencyclidine (PCP)); Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During
Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 105, 107 (1995)
(citing a study claiming as many as 739,000 drug-exposed infants are born each year). But see
Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 948-49 (1997).
Roberts criticized the media after an examination of articles citing the NAPARE figures re-
vealed that most had exaggerated or misinterpreted the statistics. Id. The study's numbers in-
cluded any amount of exposure to any drug for any length of time, but many articles
extrapolated the statistics to mean that all 375,000 infants were actually harmed and/or exposed
to cocaine. Id. In fact, the study did not indicate that all 375,000 suffered any injury and re-
vealed that only 50,000 to 100,000 infants were specifically cocaine-exposed. Id.
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shows no signs of slowing down. One commentator has estimated that
by the year 2000, well beyond 500,000 cocaine-exposed infants will be
born each year in this country alone.5
Public outrage at the problem has been fueled by dramatic descrip-
tions of "crack babies" that have been widely reported in the media. 6
Drug-exposed infants are believed to be prone to a wide variety of
severe health problems.7 The nation's anger at this problem has both
moral and economic components. From a moral standpoint, it seems
outrageous that a mother would force a newborn to become a drug
addict from its first moments on earth. Once an innocent child is af-
fected, drug abuse is no longer a "victimless crime."'8 Purely economic
issues have also added to the public outcry. Many drug-exposed chil-
dren are from poor families,9 so the health and learning problems they
may face in the future will be funded in large part by taxpayers. 10
The government's response to this crisis has been nearly identical to
its answer to other drug-related problems: increased prosecutions
under current laws and a call for new legislation." Since the early
1980s, more than 200 women in over 30 jurisdictions have been prose-
5. Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal Drug Use, 25
CONN. L. REv. 393, 394 (1993) (claiming that the number of cocaine-exposed newborns each
year may be anywhere between 500,000 and 4,000,000).
6. See Rick DelVecchio, Child Victims of Crack-An S.F. Crisis, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1989, at
All, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File; Barbara Kantrowitz, The Crack Children,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 62; Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims, TIME, May 13, 1991, at 56.
7. See infra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the effects of prenatal cocaine exposure.
8. Drug use, like gambling and prostitution, is often defined as a "victimless crime." See Mea-
suring Crime: A Shadow on Society, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 21.
9. Ira Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202,
1204 (1990). Although drug use is relatively equal across economic and racial lines, poor and
minority women are more likely to use cocaine, the drug most frequently tested and reported.
Id.; see also infra Part III.B (discussing how this discrepancy may violate equal protection).
10. Spencer, supra note 5, at 401. In 1990, the cost of medical care for cocaine-exposed infants
was estimated at over $500 million as a result of delivery complications and long stays in inten-
sive care. Id. Because many of these children are uninsured, the government pays most of these
costs. Id. at 401-02. Furthermore, these children may require special education, which can cost
an additional $8000 per year per student. Linden, supra note 4, at 108. In Senator Pete Wilson
of California's proposed Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, he estimated
that the cost of caring for these infants is over $13 billion annually, a figure which is not corrobo-
rated by any empirical studies. Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, S. 1444,
101st Cong., § 3(b) (1989).
11. See Nancy K. Schiff, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on
Women's Rights in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (1991). States
that have proposed legislation making it a felony to give birth to a drug-addicted child include
Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio. Id. An act that would give federal grants to states for
treatment programs was proposed in the United States Senate but was not enacted. See Child
Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, S. 1444.
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cuted for ingesting drugs while pregnant.' 2 States have charged these
women under very broad interpretations of current child abuse and
drug trafficking statutes.13 Nearly all of these proceedings failed to
end in convictions 14 because most courts have refused to include a
fetus as a "child" under the statutes.15 A possible result of this failure
is the slightly more moderate stance states have adopted since 1990.16
Currently, the majority of states do not automatically consider a new-
born with drugs in his or her system an abused child for the purposes
of criminal prosecution.' 7 Nevertheless, attempted prosecutions have
not vanished and may in fact be on the upswing. 18
The problem of drug-exposed infants is clearly tragic and over-
whelming. The desire of prosecutors, judges, and legislators to act
upon it is understandable and commendable. Prosecuting women
criminally for this behavior, however, is a knee-jerk reaction to a
problem that instead requires intense reason. In its rush to punish
these women, the judiciary has overlooked obvious and fatal flaws in-
herent in this course of action. Criminal prosecution for fetal abuse
under current child abuse statutes is clearly unconstitutional and con-
trary to legislative intent. Moreover, even laws specifically tailored to
fetal abuse are susceptible to constitutional challenges and serious log-
ical failings.
12. See Kandall & Chavkin, supra note 2, at 639 (claiming about 50 prosecutions through
1991); Louise Marlene Chan, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation Criminal-
izing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FoROHAM URB. L.J. 199, 201-02 (1993) (citing over 160
criminal proceedings through the end of 1992); Spencer, supra note 5, at 394 (indicating approxi-
mately 180 arrests through 1993); Lynn Smith, Punish or Protect?, L.A. TiMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at
El (reporting that more than 200 women in over 30 states have been arrested and charged).
13. Charges have included drug possession, drug distribution, delivery of a controlled sub-
stance to a minor, criminal child abuse, and criminal child neglect. See Spencer, supra note 5, at
394; VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 451; infra Part I.A.
14. By the late 1980s, 167 women had been convicted of some type of fetal abuse; 21 of them
appealed and all their convictions were successfully overturned. Veronique Mistiaen, Legal
Haze: Is Drug Use During Pregnancy Child Abuse?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1992, (Womanews), at 1.
To date, the only prosecution under an existing child abuse statute to withstand state supreme
court scrutiny is Whitner v. State, discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
15. See, e.g., People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846 (City Ct. 1992) ("[W]hen our Legisla-
ture enacts laws concerning unborn children, it says so explicitly .... The statute herein [Endan-
gering the Welfare of a Child] restricts its application to children in being.").
16. See Marilena Lencewicz, Don't Crack the Cradle: Minnesota's Effective Solution for the
Prevention of Prenatal Substance Abuse-Analysis of Minnesota Statute Section 626.5561, 63
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 599, 605 (1994) (noting that prosecu-
tions had decreased and no new legislation had been passed since 1992).
17. Memorandum from the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU, Update of State Legisla-
tion Regarding Drug/Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy (Aug. 10, 1994) (on file with the DePaul
Law Review).
18. Infra Parts I.A.2 and II.
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Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the legal background
of fetal abuse prosecutions and the science of fetal harm. Part II ex-
amines the important case of Whitner v. State,19 in which the Supreme
Court of South Carolina upheld a fetal abuse prosecution. Part III
explores some of the constitutional implications of prosecution, in-
cluding the difficulty of reconciling fetal abuse laws with the right of
reproductive freedom as well as equal protection concerns. Part IV
discusses the impact of allowing fetal abuse prosecutions to continue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Fetal Abuse Prosecutions
1. The Evolution of Fetal Rights
Under the common law, fetuses had no rights, so injury or death
caused by third parties could not be vindicated in tort.20 In the middle
of the century, however, courts determined that third-party injury to a
viable fetus implicated an interest that may be actionable, and every
jurisdiction allowed such an action by 1972.21 A few years after the
rights of a viable fetus were recognized, courts began expanding the
doctrine by concluding that fetuses have rights even before viability. 22
States have also enacted legislation holding third parties criminally lia-
ble for causing injury to fetuses. 23 Recently, fetal rights have been
acknowledged in domestic courts.24 This expansion of fetal rights vis-
19. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
20. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill. 1900); Newman v. City of Detroit, 274
N.W. 710, 711 (Mich. 1937); Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (N.Y. 1921).
21. See Renee I. Solomon, Note and Comment, Future Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Pri-
vate Parties, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 411, 412 (1991) (noting also that Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp.
138 (D.D.C. 1946), was the first case to allow an action for negligence resulting in prenatal
injury); see also Stacey L. Best, Comment, Fetal Equality? The Equality State's Response to the
Challenge of Protecting Unborn Children, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 193, 198-200 (1997) (dis-
cussing the courts' increasing acknowledgment of fetal rights).
22. See Best, supra note 21, at 198-201 (citing Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960); Sylvia
v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966)). The point at which a wrongful death action may be
maintained varies by state. For example, in Georgia, fetuses have rights at quickening (fetal
movement), which occurs at approximately the fourth month of pregnancy; in Missouri, how-
ever, "the life of each human being begins at conception" and parents "have protectable inter-
ests in the life, health and well-being of their unborn child." Aaron Epstein, Do Fetuses Have
Rights?, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, (Nation/World), at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Tamtrb File. In South Dakota, a woman was allowed to sue for her miscarriage seven weeks into
her pregnancy due to salmonella poisoning. Id. The court reasoned that the state legislature
"clearly intended to encompass nonviable children in the term 'unborn children' [in the wrongful
death statute]." Id.
23. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.4 (West 1997) (making aggravated battery of a fetus
a Class 2 felony); see also Solomon, supra note 21, at 413 & n.6 (listing 18 state feticide statutes).
24. Solomon, supra note 21, at 413. For example, one court found that a "fetus is a person for
the purpose of issuing a protective order." Id. (citing Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991
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A-vis third parties has had an interesting result: third parties have
monitored mothers' behavior out of fear of liability.2 5
In tort law, jurisdictions are split regarding the rights of a fetus
against its mother. One line of cases has refused to recognize a fetus
as a separate being whose mother has a concrete legal duty to ensure
the best possible prenatal environment for her child. 26 These deci-
sions expressed the fear that recognizing a cause of action by a fetus
against its mother may expose her to liability for "any act or omission
on her part"2 7 which may negatively impact her child. Courts in this
line are also unwilling to accept the consequences of creating a legally
adversarial relationship between mother and child from the moment
of conception.28
Other courts have expanded upon the right of recovery by a new-
born or its parents against third parties who inflict prenatal injuries
upon the fetus.29 These cases allow children to bring a negligence ac-
tion against their mothers, just as they may against any other negligent
third party, concluding that "a child has a legal right to begin life with
a sound mind and body."' 30 This argument has also been used to jus-
tify forcing pregnant women to undergo medical treatment, such as
caesarean sections and cervical surgery, to prevent obstetrical compli-
cations and fetal injury.31 Several courts and prosecutors have used
this type of analysis to again expand a mother's liability, this time in
the criminal arena.32
(Fam. Ct. 1984)). The court further stated that the decision "in no way conflicts with [the
woman's] privacy right to freely decide what to do with her pregnancy." Id..
25. See Robb London, Two Waiters Lose Jobs for Liquor Warning to Woman, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1991, § 1, at 7. One woman, for example, was refused an alcoholic drink at a restaurant
because she was pregnant; the waiters who would not serve the woman were fired. Id. A
woman's health club revoked her membership when the club found out she was ten weeks preg-
nant. Solomon, supra note 21, at 420. The revocation implied that the club was fearful of liabil-
ity, but the club claimed it was concerned for the fetus, even though the woman, an experienced
bodybuilder, regularly consulted her obstetrician. Id.
26. See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988) (refusing to recognize a
cause of action by an infant against her mother for prenatal injuries sustained in an auto acci-
dent); Cullotta v. Cullotta, 678 N.E.2d 717, 718 (11. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that an infant does
not have a cause of action against his deceased mother for injuries suffered in utero).
27. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (recognizing a child's right to
bring suit against one who negligently inflicts prenatal injuries).
30. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a fetus has a
cause of action against its mother for negligently taking tetracycline during pregnancy, resulting
in discoloration of the child's teeth); see Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466 (N.H. 1992) (finding
a mother liable to her child for negligently crossing the street, causing prenatal injuries).
31. See Solomon, supra note 21, at 413-15 ("Forced medical treatment has paved the way for
shocking numbers of prosecutions of pregnant women.").
32. See infra Part I.A.2.
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2. The Growth of Fetal Abuse Prosecutions
One of the earliest prosecutions of a pregnant woman for ingesting
drugs occurred in Reyes v. Superior Court,33 where a pregnant heroin
user was charged with felony child endangerment. 34 The defendant
was warned by a nurse of the dangers of continued use of heroin and
failure to seek prenatal care, but she ignored the advice. 35 Her twin
sons were born addicted to heroin and suffered withdrawal symp-
toms. 36 Nevertheless, the proceedings were dismissed by the appellate
court, which refused to find that the endangerment statute protected a
fetus.37 The court reasoned that the statute's use of the word "child"
excluded unborn children from its application, and that the law was
clearly intended to ensure that parents care for their children, not
their fetuses.38
Subsequent prosecutions under child abuse and endangerment stat-
utes were also unsuccessful for several reasons. 39 First, courts con-
cluded that a fetus does "not become a 'child' within the
contemplation of the [child endangerment] statute until she [is]
born. '40 Second, the application of the statute in the fetal abuse con-
text was inconsistent, which led to problems of proper notice. 41 The
broad wording of child abuse and endangerment statutes also alarmed
courts, because "'the law could be construed as covering the full range
of a pregnant woman's behavior-a plainly unconstitutional result
that would, among other things, render the statutes void for vague-
ness."' 42 Finally, courts overturning fetal abuse convictions found that
legislatures did not intend to protect fetuses under child abuse stat-
33. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977).
34. Id. at 216.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 219.
38. Id. at 217-19.
39. See, e.g., State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding it
against the state's public policy to consider a fetus a child for the purposes of the aggravated
child abuse statute); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (holding that if
the criminal abuse statute were to include injury to fetuses, it would be impermissibly vague);
Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994) (holding that the child endangerment statute
does not apply to the transmission of controlled substances through the umbilical cord after
delivery); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the criminal child
endangerment statute was not meant to apply to fetuses).
40. Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 711.
41. Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 283 ("The 'case-by-case' approach suggested by the Commonwealth
is so arbitrary that, if the criminal child abuse statutes are construed to support it, the statutes
transgress reasonably identifiable limits; they lack fair notice .... ").
42. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 2707 C 1991, slip op. at 12 (Ct. C.P. Westmore-
land Co., Pa. Crim. Div. 1991)).
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utes.43 These decisions seemed to warn prosecutors that such statutes
should not be used to prosecute pregnant women for drug use without
the requisite legislative intent.44
Because all prior attempts at prosecution under child abuse laws
were unsuccessful, an extremely clever legal fiction was advanced to
charge pregnant abusers with delivery of a controlled substance to a
minor. 45 These women were charged with delivering the drug from
their bodies to the infant through the umbilical cord for the few
seconds after birth before the cord was cut.46 Although these prose-
cutions allowed states to avoid defining a fetus as a child, they have
also been unsuccessful. 47 Courts have determined that prosecutions
using drug delivery statutes provide insufficient notice and are con-
trary to legislative intent.48 First, no woman who ingests drugs while
pregnant could realistically expect to be charged with this crime.49 A
state must give notice that an act is prohibited before it may enforce a
criminal law,50 and courts are unwilling to expand a law where notice
is not clear.51
Second, the legislative history of these laws indicates that
lawmakers did not reasonably expect the statutory definition of "de-
livery" to include such a brief, involuntary act.5 2 One court found that
43. Id. at 282 (citing the opinion of the court of appeals) ("The courts cannot presume a
legislative intent to expand the class of persons treatable as victims of criminal activity."); Encoe,
885 P.2d at 599 ("We conclude that the legislature's examination of this issue and its subsequent
silence indicates that prenatal drug use [should] not be criminally prosecuted."); Gethers, 585 So.
2d at 1141-42 (finding that the legislature's choice of words in the statute "avoids any unintended
granting of legal status to the unborn").
44. See Chan, supra note 12, at 211.
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAr. ch. 893.13 (1989) (making it a first degree felony for one over 18 years
of age "to deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years").
46. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50,
51-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). Another case did not use the "post-delivery" theory and charged
the defendant for drug delivery during pregnancy. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992).
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
48. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33 (holding that the defendant could not have anticipated
being prosecuted for delivering cocaine to her unborn child by ingesting it, which conflicts with
the statutory "fair warning" mandate).
50. See Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52 ("[A] penal statute must be sufficiently definite and explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties.")
(citation omitted).
51. See Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34-35 (" 'The unambiguous words of a criminal statute are not to
be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach."' (quoting
Waldroup v. State, 30 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1944))).
52. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290; see also Chan, supra note 12, at 212 (explaining the inappro-
priateness of prosecuting women under such "pure use" statutes).
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the legislature's consideration and rejection of criminal penalties for
prenatal substance exposure was persuasive evidence that the drug de-
livery law was not meant to apply in these situations.5 3 The lack of
legislative intent supporting a broad reading of the drug delivery laws
was critical, because this area of law has been traditionally within the
competence of the legislature.5 4 Courts are generally averse to ex-
panding a criminal statute without legislative backing.55
Other cases that were dismissed before a conviction was obtained
demonstrate prosecutors' willingness to stretch the reach of legislation
not intended to apply to fetuses. Pamela Stewart-Monson's drug use
during her pregnancy led to a potentially life-threatening condition for
her unborn child; the woman was advised to rest and get immediate
medical attention if she began to hemorrhage.5 6 She disregarded the
doctor's advice and her child was born with massive brain damage,
dying less than six weeks later.5 7 The mother was charged with
"neglecting the infant after its birth, with using drugs on the delivery
day and with failing to rest and seek help for her hemorrhaging. '58
The charges were later dropped.5 9
In 1990, Diane Pfannenstiel was charged with felony child abuse for
drinking while she was four and one-half months pregnant.60 This was
a landmark case because "it was the first time that a woman was
charged with child abuse, rather than fetal abuse, before there was a
live child and for engaging in a legal activity."' 61 The prosecutor felt
53. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1293-94.
54. See Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 53 ("'A court should not place a tenuous construction on this
statute to address a problem to which legislative attention is readily directed and which it can
readily resolve if in its judgment it is an appropriate subject of legislation."' (quoting People v.
Gilbert, 324 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1982))).
55. Id. at 52 ("It is well settled that penal statutes are strictly construed, absent a legislative
statement to the contrary.") (citation omitted).
56. Solomon, supra note 21, at 415; see also Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and
the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
505-06 (1992) (describing Pamela Stewart-Monson's case).
57. Solomon, supra note 21, at 415.
58. Id.; see also Oberman, supra note 56, at 505-09 (discussing the emotional reaction this case
engenders and why that emotion should not control the state's response).
59. Solomon, supra note 21, at 415.
60. Id. at 416.
61. Id. In 1996, Deborah Zimmerman was charged with attempted murder for drinking while
pregnant. Don Terry, In Wisconsin, A Rarity of a Fetal-Harm Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at
A6. Although her child was born with severe fetal alcohol syndrome, Zimmerman was primarily
charged as a result of a statement she made to the hospital staff during her labor: "I'm just going
to go home and keep drinking and drink myself to death, and I'm going to kill this thing because
I don't want it anyways [sic]." Id.; see also Nancy Grace, Is the Prosecution of "Fetal Endanger-
ment" Illegitimate?, 82 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 72, 73 (arguing that Zimmerman's statement
distinguishes her case from those of other mothers who abuse alcohol).
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the charge was necessary because "prosecutors should not have to
wait until a child is born with defects to act to protect it."'62 The prose-
cutor was apparently not motivated by the same logic to charge the
woman's husband with child abuse. Pfannenstiel had gone to the hos-
pital, where her blood-alcohol level was measured, to seek treatment
after being beaten by her spouse.63 Charges against Pfannenstiel were
later dismissed by a judge who determined that the State could not
show probable cause that her fetus was harmed by her behavior.64
3. Other Responses to Prenatal Drug Use
Many states have legislation concerning drug use during pregnancy,
but most of these statutes are aimed at identifying those in need of
welfare intervention, not criminal sanctions. 65 Another way states
have tried to combat the problem of prenatal drug use is to give the
pregnant drug user a type of prosecutorial immunity if she agrees to
enter treatment. Minnesota, for example, has implemented legislation
that allows local welfare agencies to intervene if any woman is re-
ported to be pregnant and using controlled substances.66 The statute
authorizes civil commitment for any woman who "refuses recom-
mended voluntary services or fails recommended treatment. '67 A
similar program in the city of Charleston, South Carolina, has been
diligent in its mission to identify pregnant drug users.68 Guidelines
were written for all doctors to obtain consent to drug test pregnant
patients whom the doctors suspected were using drugs.69 Positive re-
sults were reported to the authorities, who prosecuted women that
refused free treatment. 70
62. Pregnant Woman is Charged with Child Abuse for Drinking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1990, at
B8.
63. Best, supra note 21, at 207-08 (citation omitted).
64. Case Against Pregnant Woman is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, § 1, at 10.
65. See, e.g., Best, supra note 21, at 207 & n.100 (listing several state statutes authorizing
welfare investigation of pregnant drug users).
66. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1997); see generally Lencewicz, supra note 16
(describing the Minnesota statute).
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561. Even this intermediate course of action is essentially a
state determination that a fetus has cognizable rights under the law. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02, subd. 13 (West 1989) ("Civil commitment is sought only if... [there is a] substantial
likelihood of ... harm to self or others as demonstrated by ... an attempt or threat.., of harm
to self or others .... "); see also Lencewicz, supra note 16, at 624 ("The individual must present a
substantial threat to him/herself or to another in order to justify involuntary civil commitment by
the state." (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972))).
68. Gina Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1990, at A13.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 4, at 941-44 (describing the Charleston experiment).
1998]
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As one court that overturned a fetal abuse conviction noted, "[pub-
lic health] experts unanimously oppose prosecution for prenatal
abuse."' 71 Health experts instead conclude that a "coordinated mul-
tidisciplinary approach in the development of a plan without criminal
sanctions has the best chance of helping children and families. ' 72 This
approach includes prevention education, early intervention, and avail-
able, effective treatment programs. 73 Despite the universal call for
such programs, no state has implemented a treatment scheme that
does not also allow for civil commitment or criminal sanctions, even
though the recommended programs may work better.74 At least one
local municipality, however, seems to be more sensitive to the need
for a different approach. In Albuquerque, New Mexico, a neonatolo-
gist and the district attorney developed an alternative sentencing plan
for women arrested for drug charges and then found to be pregnant. 75
This program allows these women to forego criminal sanctions for the
drug offense and instead enter "a drug treatment program that is
71. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1993). Many major public health orga-
nizations have publicly denounced criminal sanctions for prenatal drug use. See Committee on
Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 640 (1990); Law & Medicine/
Board of Trustees Representative, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2670
(1990); Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment,
267 JAMA 406, 408 (1992); American Nurses Association, Position Statement on Opposition to
Criminal Prosecution of Women for Use of Drugs While Pregnant & Support for Treatment
Services for Alcohol and Drug Dependent Women of Childbearing Age (1991) (on file with the
DePaul Law Review); American Public Health Association, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant
Women, Public Policy Statement Adopted at its 118th Annual Meeting (1990) (on file with the
DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter APHA Report]; American Society of Addiction Medicine,
Inc., Public Policy Statement on Chemically Dependent Women and Pregnancy, at 47 (Sept. 25,
1989) (on file with the DePaul Law Review); National Association of Public Child Welfare Ad-
ministrators, Guiding Principles for Working with Substance-Abusing Families and Drug-Ex-
posed Children: The Child Welfare Response 1 (Jan. 1991) (on file with the DePaul Law Review)
[hereinafter APWA Report].
72. Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 640.
73. See American Society of Addiction Medicine, Inc., supra note 71, at 47; see also APHA
Report, supra note 71 (recommending further that treatment facilities develop outreach pro-
grams); Wendy Chavkin, Mandatory Treatment for Drug Use During Pregnancy, 266 JAMA
1556, 1560 (1991) (noting that treatment facilities should be readily available and appear wel-
coming and useful to clients). Another commentator has stressed that multiple services must be
made available in a single location, "because keeping appointments in different sites is difficult
for all mothers with young babies, and especially those using drugs." Mayes et al., supra note 71,
at 408.
74. "Research has focused only on the effect of drugs and alcohol on the fetus, rather than on
preventing and treating drug and alcohol abuse before a woman becomes pregnant. This ap-
proach ignores the causes and focuses only on the result, which does nothing to stop harm to
future fetuses." Best, supra note 21, at 197.
75. Wendy Chavkin & Vicki Breitbart, Reproductive Health and Blurred Professional Bound-
aries, 6 WOMEN's HEALTH ISSUES 89, 94 (1996).
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geared to families with young children and run by the [hospital's] pe-
diatrics department. '76
B. The Science of Prenatal Harm
An examination of the scientific evidence of prenatal harm is neces-
sary because "[g]ood science is needed to make sound clinical and
public policy decisions. ' 77 Conclusive evidence of cocaine's effects is
not available, yet many states have already presumed that "crack ba-
bies" are permanently damaged and have implemented prosecutorial
policies based on incomplete science. 78
1. Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine
Medical problems associated with prenatal exposure to cocaine are
not well defined, but are said to include tremulousness, irritability, low
birth weight, and stiff motor movement.79 Other dangers may include
small strokes and deficient limb development and kidney structure.80
Delivery complications are also associated with cocaine use, including
abruptio placentae (premature detachment of the placenta) and an in-
creased risk of premature labor and delivery.81 Children born ex-
posed to cocaine may also be more prone to behavioral problems in
early childhood.82 Studies investigating the existence of cocaine-in-
duced harms, however, are not conclusive for several reasons.
For example, despite the media's immediate acceptance of the fact
that drug-using mothers inevitably give birth to "crack babies," very
little documentation shows that cocaine exposure necessarily results in
trauma to the newborn.83 The amount of scientific evidence is limited,
76. Id.
77. Mayes et al., supra note 71, at 408.
78. See id.
[W]e recommend a suspension of judgment about the developmental outcome of co-
caine-exposed babies until solid scientific data are available. Whatever the damage
from prenatal exposure to cocaine may prove to be, outcome will not be improved by
an attitude that assumes that exposed children cannot be helped or that they are differ-
ent from other children.
Id.
79. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 183; Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 639-
40 (noting that these infants do not exhibit clear withdrawal symptoms, but may show irritability,
lethargy, and "an inability to respond appropriately to stimulation").
80. Howard, supra note 4, at 654.
81. See VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 445; Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at
639.
82. Smith, supra note 12, at El (quoting Dr. Ira Chasnoff, a noted prenatal addiction
researcher).
83. See Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 640 ("Many [cocaine-exposed in-
fants], however, seem to have no specific clinical manifestations in the early neonatal period.").
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and the studies that exist may be methodologically unsound.84 More-
over, "cocaine-using women often experience an uncomplicated labor
and delivery. ' 85 The worst-case scenario studies are more well-known
because research showing negative effects of prenatal drug exposure is
more likely to be accepted for presentation and publication than stud-
ies showing no impairment, "even though the rejected papers with
negative findings tended to be methodologically more rigorous. '86
The occasional poor outcomes of drug-exposed children may be
caused by a number of other factors accompanying cocaine use, in-
cluding sexually transmitted diseases, drinking, smoking, use of other
drugs, and limited prenatal care. 87 Environmental factors also nega-
tively impact these children's development. Drug-exposed infants' ir-
ritability makes the mother-child bonding period difficult, which could
lead to later behavioral problems. 8 Children raised in drug-addicted
families may endure emotional neglect and suffer from poor nutri-
tion. 89 Furthermore, a Columbia University study found that mothers
receiving welfare are three times more likely to be drug addicted than
are mothers not receiving welfare. 90 While the actual numbers of
drug-exposed children living in poverty are elusive, the effects of pov-
erty, a key factor in unhealthy pregnancies and infants, are seen in the
84. Mayes et al., supra note 71, at 406.
[A]vailable evidence from the newborn period is far too slim and fragmented to allow
any clear predictions about ... the course and outcome of child growth and develop-
ment. Most studies involve only small numbers of subjects and either do not control or
incompletely control for confounding variables such as other drugs and/or biological
and sociodemographic cofactors known to contribute to poor outcomes in such
children.
Id.; see generally id. at 406-07 (discussing five critical issues that taint drug-exposure studies'
methodology).
85. Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 639 (noting that this is an unexpected
outcome based on the number of risk factors involved in these cases). In an interesting twist,
one of the cases cited anecdotally as evidence of the epidemic of fetal abuse may actually show
the problem is overstated. Barbara Harris is a California woman who has adopted four of eight
children of a crack addict and is a vocal lobbyist for fetal abuse legislation. Smith, supra note 12,
at El. Her children are now quite healthy and "have shown few of the dire medical and behav-
ioral problems once predicted for drug babies." Id. One of the children in fact has an IQ of 138.
Id.
86. Mayes et al., supra note 71, at 407 (citation omitted).
87. Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 639-40; see also Roberts, supra note 4,
at 953 (citing a Northwestern University study that found "comprehensive prenatal care may
improve [the] outcome in pregnancies complicated by cocaine abuse") (citation omitted).
88. See Richard Q. Bell, Minor Physical Anomalies: Relation to Later Achievement, in RE-
SEARCH IN INFANT ASSESSMENT 25 (Natalie W. Paul ed., 1989); Bennett, supra note 4, at 183.
89. Howard, supra note 4, at 655.
90. William Claiborne, Substance Abuse Among Welfare's Young Mothers, WASH. POST, June
28, 1994, at A3 (noting also that this study has been criticized by the Department of Health &
Human Services for including occasional users in the number of addicts).
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lives of many drug-exposed infants.91 The media's labeling of the chil-
dren as "irremediably damaged" can also lead to poor outcomes for
two reasons. 92 First, society's assumption that these children are im-
paired makes it difficult to place them in foster care or in permanent
adoptive families, so they may languish in state facilities. 93 Second,
services aimed at helping the drug-exposed children "may be geared
to caretake rather than challenge children's capacities or to remediate
effectively. '94
2. Prenatal Exposure to Legal Substances
Many licit substances have been proven to be toxic to a fetus and
definitive predictors of poor infant health. Alcohol exposure is well
documented as the cause of a multitude of defects, and the problem is
widespread. A study published in the Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association found that twenty percent of pregnant women had
drunk alcohol in the previous month.95 Fetal alcohol syndrome
("FAS") affects one out of every 750 births in the United States;96
only seven percent of women who drink heavily (approximately six
ounces of absolute alcohol per day) can expect to have a normal
baby.97 FAS is "the leading cause of mental retardation in the West-
ern World, exceeding Down's syndrome and cerebral palsy."' 98 Other
physical problems associated with prenatal alcohol exposure include
growth deficiency, microcephaly, delayed motor and language devel-
opment, and hyperactivity. 99 Ninety percent of FAS sufferers experi-
ence ophthalmologic abnormalities. 100 Maternal drinking during
91. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 532-33; see also Lencewicz, supra note 16, at 610 (adding
that boarder nurseries and foster care can also negatively impact the children's long-term
outcome).
92. Mayes et al., supra note 71, at 407.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. More Education Needed on Liquor's Harm to Unborn, CHI. TRIa., Dec. 22, 1993, (evening
edition), at A7.
96. Roberts, supra note 4, at 953-54. Children of low-income families have a much greater
risk of being afflicted with FAS than those from upper incomes, even controlling for alcohol
intake. Id. The differential is believed to be a result of the added effect of poor nutrition in the
lower-income group. Id.
97. Susan R. Weinberg, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health?, 58 IND. L.J. 531, 534 (1983);
see also Jane Adams, Prenatal Exposure to Teratogenic Agents & Neurodevelopmental Outcome,
in RESEARCH IN INFANT ASSESSMENT 63, 65 (Natalie W. Paul ed., 1989) (noting that only 10-
15% of alcohol-exposed children are affected at birth; 30-40% are affected in childhood).
98. Bennett, supra note 4, at 183 (citing a 1989 American Medical Association study).
99. Id.
100. Kerstin Stromland & Ann Hellstrom, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome-An Ophthalmological
and Socioeducational Prospective Study, 97 PEDIATRICS 845, 845 (1996).
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pregnancy is also linked to a higher incidence of acute myeloid leuke-
mia in infants.1°1
Cigarette smoking during pregnancy increases the risks of spontane-
ous abortion and prematurity10 2 and is the leading cause of low birth
weight in the United States. 0 3 Smoking also is linked to an increase
in the occurrence of idiopathic mental retardation.10 4 Approximately
one-third of cases of idiopathic mental retardation in children of
smokers are attributable solely to the mothers' smoking. 0 5 Prenatal
exposure to cigarette smoke is also associated with sudden infant
death syndrome and can result in a depressed immune system later in
life.'O6
Prescription medication can also cause medical problems in fetuses
and infants.'0 7 Prozac, for example, causes temporary jitteriness and
breathing problems in newborns. 0 8 Lithium taken during pregnancy
increases the risk of fetal cardiac abnormalities five-fold and can cause
a greater risk of malformations and infant death.109 Little is known
about the effects of medications on fetuses due to the ethical issues
involved in testing drugs on pregnant women." 0 Animal tests do not
sufficiently detect dangers; thalidomide, the drug that caused severe
birth defects in the 1950s, produced no anomalies in lab animals."'
Over-the-counter medicines are also worrisome, perhaps even more
so than other medications, because their easy availability leads women
to presume they are safe. 12 But maternal ingestion of aspirin and
101. Xiao-Ou Shu et al., Parental Alcohol Consumption, Cigarette Smoking, and Risk of Infant
Leukemia: A Childrens Cancer Group Study, 88 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 24, 24 (1996).
102. BARBARA LUKE, PREVENTING PREMATURE BIRTH 98 (1995) ("Spontaneous abortion ...
occurs 20 to 80 percent more frequently among smokers.") (citation omitted); Weinberg, supra
note 97, at 534.
103. Lucille Renwick, Critical Care, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at 14.
104. Carolyn D. Drews et al., The Relationship Between Idiopathic Mental Retardation and
Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy, 97 PEDIATRICS 547, 550 (1996).
105. Id.
106. SMOKING & REPRODUCTION: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY XiV-XV (Ernest L. Abel
ed., 1982) [hereinafter SMOKING & REPRODUCTION].
107. A United States survey found that during pregnancy, "45% of women may use at least
one drug on prescription, and many more use drugs bought over the counter." Martin J. Whittle
& Kevin P. Hanretty, Identifying Abnormalities, in PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY 8, 8 (Peter C.
Rubin ed., 1987); see generally RICHARD S. ABRAMS, HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS DUR-
ING PREGNANCY (1989) (discussing numerous medications and their effects on fetal health).
108. Shari Roan, The Other Drug Moms; Since Testing Just Isn't Done on Pregnant Women,
It's Tough to Figure Out Which Medications Are Safe, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at E4.
109. J.B. Loudon, Psychotropic Drugs, in PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY 49, 52 (Peter C. Rubin
ed., 1987).
110. Roan, supra note 108, at E4.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs may increase the risk of
persistent pulmonary hypertension of the newborn. 113 Even baby as-
pirin taken by a pregnant mother is contraindicated because it may
cause fetal bleeding. 114
A pregnant woman who has a chronic medical condition may also
be endangering her unborn child's life. Epileptic seizures and uncon-
trolled asthma may cause fetal injury due to oxygen deprivation.11 5 A
diabetic woman has a three times greater risk of giving birth to a child
with congenital abnormalities, even if her diabetes is controlled.
1 16
The mortality rate of a child born to a mother with renal disease is
fifteen percent, and the condition increases the danger of prematurity
and growth retardation. 1 7
Pregnant women have other affirmative and negative obligations,
the disregard of which can have devastating health effects on a fetus.
For example, there is an undisputed correlation between obtaining
prenatal care and having a healthier baby. 1 8 Other acts and condi-
tions are also significant factors in the relative health of a child. A
child is in danger of serious health risks at the moment of conception
if the mother does not get the proper nutrition,1 9 is too old,120 too
113. Linda J. Van Marter et al., Persistent Pulmonary Hypertension of the Newborn and Smok-
ing and Aspirin and Nonsteroidal Antiinflammatory Drug Consumption During Pregnancy, 97
PEDIATRICS 658, 659 (1996).
114. Roan, supra note 108, at El; see also JENNIFER R. NIEBYL, DRUG USE IN PREGNANCY 26-
27 (1982) (noting that aspirin is not recommended during pregnancy due to bleeding and inabil-
ity to clot).
115. Anthony Hopkins, Epilepsy and Anticonvulsant Drugs, in PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY
96, 103 (Peter C. Rubin ed., 1987); K. Fan Chung & Peter J. Barnes, Treatment of Asthma, in
PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY 41, 41 (Peter C. Rubin ed., 1987).
116. N.J.A. Vaughan, Treatment of Diabetes, in PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY 111, 112 (Peter
C. Rubin ed., 1987).
117. ABRAMS, supra note 107, at 71-72.
118. VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 457. Studies suggest that prenatal care has even more of an
impact on fetal health than maternal drug use. Id. The health care costs of treating an addict
who obtains prenatal care average $7000, which includes the costs of prenatal care and delivery.
Oberman, supra note 56, at 514-15. Without prenatal care, the additional costs of neonatal in-
tensive care bring the average price of delivery up to $31,000. Id. at 515.
119. Poor nutrition in utero increases the child's risk of cardiovascular problems later in life.
Dino A. Giussani, Evidence for Link Between Prenatal and Adult Health Grows, 348 LANCET
535, 535 (1996). Vitamins such as folic acid should be taken well before pregnancy to best re-
duce the risk of birth defects. Deborah Mann Lake, Before Conception is the Time to Reduce
Risk of Birth Defects, Says March of Dimes, Hous. POST, Jan. 31, 1995, at Dl, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Houpst File.
120. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that women over 35
are more likely than younger women to have a stillborn child. Pregnant Women over Age 35
Face Higher Risk of Stillbirth, Study Says, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1995, at 50A, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rmtnew File. The stillbirth rate among women over 40 is twice that of
women under 30. Id.
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young,121 or if any genetic disorders run in either side of the family
tree. 122 A mother who exercises too much 23 or cleans the cat litter
box124 may endanger her child. A pregnant woman whose work ex-
poses her to toxic substances, 25 high stress,126 heavy lifting, 127 or long
hours 128 may injure her child by remaining employed during her preg-
nancy. A mother's postpartum activities can also threaten the health
of her child. Any legal or illegal substances a mother ingests while she
is breast-feeding are passed on to the child. 29 Secondhand smoke is
dangerous for young children, who may suffer a number of health
problems caused by exposure. 30
121. Complications caused by teenage pregnancy include low birth weight, increased risk of
death in the first year, and developmental problems. Vital Statistics, WASH. POST., July 2, 1996,
(Health), at 5. Another study found that young maternal age (average age 16.1, range of age 12-
18 years) increased the risk of negative effects from prenatal tobacco and marijuana exposure.
Marie D. Cornelius et al., Prenatal Tobacco and Marijuana Use Among Adolescents: Effects on
Offspring Gestational Age, Growth, and Morphology, 95 PEDIATRICS 738, 738 (1995). The chil-
dren of young mothers exhibited more pronounced effects even though they had lower exposure
to harmful substances than the children of adult mothers in the study. Id.
122. Deadly hereditary diseases include the blood disorders Sickle-Cell Anemia and Thalas-
semia, and Tay-Sachs Disease, a fatal brain disease. Lake, supra note 119, at D1.
123. While moderate exercise is beneficial to both mother and baby, certain activities and
overexertion can harm a fetus. Sally Squires, Pregnant Women Get Green Light to Exercise: New
Guidelines Stress the Benefits for Most Mothers-to-Be, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1994, (Health), at 7.
124. The toxoplasmosis bacteria can be transmitted to a pregnant mother through infected cat
feces and to her fetus through transplacental infection. Newborn Screening Fact Sheets, 98 PEDI-
ATRICS 473, 493 (1996). Most exposed infants are asymptomatic at birth, but by age 20, as many
as 85% will be afflicted with blindness and retardation. Id.
125. Any amount of fetal exposure to radiation increases a child's risk of leukemia; embryos
are even more sensitive to radiation's harmful effects. Weinberg, supra note 97, at 541. Even
though exposure to lead causes fetal injury, the United States Supreme Court struck down the
"fetal protection" policies of a battery manufacturer as violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499
U.S. 187, 211 (1991). The manufacturer barred fertile women from working in certain jobs that
were hazardous due to the amount of lead exposure. Id. at 192.
126. Women who work in stressful jobs can expect "higher rates of premature labor, preterm
birth, and low birthweight." LUKE, supra note 102, at 80.
127. Id. at 52 ("Repetitive lifting is worse than intermittent, and heavy lifting is worse than
light.").
128. Long Hours at Work Can Triple Miscarriage Risk, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1997, § 13, at 10
(discussing a University of California at Davis study indicating that a pregnant mother who
works more than 45 hours per week has a three times greater risk of miscarriage in the first
trimester than a mother who works less than 35 hours, even accounting for smoking and
drinking).
129. There have been cases of nicotine poisoning of infants who were breastfed by heavy
smokers. SMOKING AND REPRODUCTION, supra note 106, at xii. Moderate smoking (ten ciga-
rettes per day) also causes lower breast milk volume and lower fat concentrations in the milk,
which makes it less healthy for babies. John L. Ey et al., Passive Smoke Exposure and Otitis
Media in the First Year of Life, 95 PEDIATRICS 670, 675 (1995).
130. Passive smoke inhalation increases the number of respiratory illnesses suffered by chil-
dren, especially in those under two years of age. Michael A. Wall et al., Pediatric Office-Based
Smoking Intervention: Impact on Maternal Smoking and Relapse, 96 PEDIATRICS 622, 623 (1995).
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The father's lifestyle also affects the health of the fetus. Before con-
ception, the father's exposure to toxic chemicals, 131 smoking,132 and
drinking alcohol1 33 may lead to fetal defects. Even during pregnancy,
the father may affect fetal health. Some toxic substances "absorbed
by the exposed male may contaminate the seminal fluid and cross the
placental barrier through intercourse. '134 A man who batters his
pregnant spouse may harm the fetus indirectly as well as directly. 135
A battered woman may be less likely to seek prenatal care because
her abuser may prevent her from seeing a doctor regularly.136
II. WHITNER v. STA TE. DRAMATIC EXPANSION OF FETAL RIGHTS
As previously discussed, many states have attempted to prosecute
pregnant women for drug use under child abuse and drug delivery
statutes.137 Courts rejected these attempts as unconstitutional and
contrary to legislative intent. 38 In the summer of 1996, however, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a conviction for child en-
dangerment based on the mother's use of cocaine in the days before
her baby was delivered. 139 Whitner v. Statet40 indicates that past judi-
cial deference to legislative authority in the area of fetal rights may be
at an end. The Whitner majority's broad reasoning could easily be
employed by other courts in states with similar statutes and bodies of
law, assuming the case is not overturned by the United States
Supreme Court. 14 1
Heavy maternal smoking is also a significant factor in the development of middle ear infections
in the child's first year of life. Ey et al., supra note 129, at 670. Infants exposed to smoke had
two times the risk of contracting infections when controlling for other risk factors; infants who
had had a low birth weight were three times more likely to contract infections. Id.
131. Lake, supra note 119, at D1.
132. The children of fathers who smoke within one month prior to conception have an ele-
vated risk of contracting acute lymphoid leukemia. Shu et al., supra note 101, at 24.
133. Best, supra note 21, at 213 & n.137 (discussing animal studies that show "'fathers who
drink heavily before their mates' pregnancy can be as responsible for damage to their offspring
as alcoholic mothers"' (quoting GARY MCCUEN, BORN HOOKED 15 (1991))).
134. REGINA KENEN, REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE: MENDING JOBS, MAN-
AGING PREGNANCIES 37 (1993).
135. Best, supra note 21, at 213 (citation omitted).
136. Id.
137. See supra Part I.A.
138. See supra Part I.A.
139. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
140. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
141. At the time of this writing, certiorari had not been granted in this case.
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A. Facts and Procedural History
South Carolina has been in the forefront of states that hold women
criminally liable for using drugs during pregnancy. 142 The city of
Charleston's resolve to identify and prosecute pregnant drug users is
seemingly unparalleled. 143 One commentator illustrated the depth of
Charleston's commitment to ensuring that pregnant women stay drug-
free: "Three weeks after her arrest, [Lori Griffin] went into labor and
was taken, still in handcuffs and shackles, to M.U.S.C.[, the public hos-
pital]. Once at the hospital, Ms. Griffin was kept handcuffed to her
bed during the entire delivery."' 144
It was in the state of South Carolina that Cornelia Whitner gave
birth to a son who had been exposed to cocaine from her late-term use
of the drug. 45 She chose to plead guilty to the charge of criminal
child neglect, hoping that she would be admitted to a residential treat-
ment program. 146 At the time of her plea, Whitner was already in
counseling, she was drug-free, and her baby son was healthy.147 The
judge who accepted the plea was not receptive to Whitner's desire for
treatment and simply stated, "I think I'll let her go to jail," sentencing
her to eight years in prison.1 48
Whitner did not initially appeal her conviction but later filed for
Post Conviction Relief on two grounds, both of which related to the
fact that a fetus is not a child under the child neglect statute. 49 First,
she claimed that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
accept her plea because the offense of abusing a fetus did not exist.' 50
Second, Whitner argued that her counsel at the plea hearing was inef-
fective by not advising her that the neglect statute might not apply to
her case. 151 Whitner won her appeal, so the State then appealed to
the Supreme Court of South Carolina.1 52
142. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 941 ("[South Carolina] bears the dubious distinction of
having prosecuted the largest number of women for maternal drug use.").
143. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
144. Roberts, supra note 4, at 943.
145. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
146. Roberts, supra note 4, at 944.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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B. The Majority Opinion
The Whitner court began the opinion by explaining its plan to find
the legislature's intent in enacting the child endangerment statute.1 53
The majority initially restated the primary canon of statutory con-
struction: statutory language controls interpretation "where a statute
is complete, plain, and unambiguous.' 1 54 Without discussing whether
this particular statute was unambiguous, the court then proclaimed
that it must also consider "the word and its meaning in conjunction
with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law."'1 55
Whitner's examination of intent also included the presumption that
the legislature, when enacting a statute, is aware of earlier laws and
how the courts have construed them.1 56 With its theory of statutory
construction in mind, the court then set about to divine the intended
meaning of the word "child" in the child endangerment statute. 157
The Whitner court first recognized that under South Carolina law,
viable fetuses have often been considered persons with certain legal
rights. 58 In 1960, the Supreme Court of South Carolina allowed the
application of the wrongful death statute to the death of a newborn
who had suffered injury in utero, by reasoning that a viable fetus did
have a life separable from that of its mother. 159 The court later ex-
panded this doctrine to fetuses that were not born alive; because the
fetus has a separable life once it is viable, a later birth is irrelevant to
the determination. 60 In 1984, this rationale was finally applied to a
South Carolina criminal statute.' 6 ' The court upheld a conviction for
voluntary manslaughter of a fetus, even though there was no state law
against feticide. 162 The court found no reason to define a fetus as a
person under civil law but not in the criminal context.' 63 Following
153. Id. The South Carolina child abuse and endangerment statute provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall, without
lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in § 20-7-490, the proper care and
attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such
child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of the circuit court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
154. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
155. Id. (citation omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 779-80 (citing Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1960)).
160. Id. at 780 (citing Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964)).
161. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
162. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780 (citing State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984)).
163. Id. (citing Home, 319 S.E.2d at 704) (finding the civil/criminal distinction "'grossly incon-
sistent"' and judicially creating the crime of feticide).
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the logic of earlier decisions recognizing fetal rights, the Whitner court
noted: "[I1t would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person
for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for
purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse. 164
Having elucidated the "plain meaning" of the word "child," the
Whitner court then concluded that the state's broad policy of protect-
ing children leads to the same interpretation. 165 The court reasoned
that because the effects of abuse occurring after birth "often pale in
comparison to those resulting from abuse suffered by the viable fetus
before birth,' 66 the state's policy of child protection is best served by
the court's liberal reading of the statute.167
After concluding that a fetus is indeed a child, the majority then
countered Whitner's arguments against the validity of her prosecu-
tion. 168 Whitner first claimed that because eight bills dealing with pre-
natal drug exposure had recently been introduced in the legislature,
lawmakers themselves did not believe that the child endangerment
law applied to the problem.169 The court countered by citing case law
for the proposition that later acts by a legislature "cast no light on the
intent of the legislature which enacted the statute being construed.' 7
0
Instead, the court held, the statutory language alone should control
interpretation.' 7 '
Whitner next argued that the majority's interpretation would lead
to "absurd results," because "every action by a pregnant woman that
endangers or is likely to endanger a fetus, whether otherwise legal or
illegal, would constitute unlawful neglect under the statute.' 72 The
court dispensed with the "parade of horribles" first by purporting to
show that a number of legal actions may become illegal if they endan-
164. Id. (concluding that the Hall decision "rested primarily on the plain meaning of the word
'person' in light of existing medical knowledge concerning fetal development").
165. Id. at 780-81 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985)) ("It shall be the
policy of this State to concentrate on the prevention of children's problems as the most impor-
tant strategy which can be planned and implemented on behalf of children and their families.").
166. Id. at 780.
167. Id. at 780-81.
168. Id. at 781.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Home Health Servs., Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Environmen-
tal Control, 379 S.E.2d 734, 736 n.1 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)); cf. In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 764
(Conn. 1992) (considering the legislature's rejection of bills with strong penalties for prenatal
drug use as evidence of a legislative intent against reading a harsh penalty for drug use into the
termination of parental rights statute).
171. Whither, 492 S.E.2d at 781. The court gave no explanation for why, if language alone is
controlling, it looked to prior expansions of fetal rights and general state policy to come to its
conclusion.
172. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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ger a child.173 By way of example, the court claimed that a parent who
drinks too much might be liable for neglect even though the act of
drinking is legal.174 Whitner's majority also saw this entire argument
as specious, since Cornelia Whitner was not convicted for ingesting a
legal substance, and "this case ... is the only case we are called upon
to decide here."'1 75 Another factor the court cited to counter
Whitner's argument is that she must have known she was endangering
her fetus since "it is well documented and within the realm of public
knowledge that such use [of crack cocaine during pregnancy] can
cause serious harm to the viable unborn child."'1 76
Next, the court stated that it was unmoved by the many decisions in
other states that declined to hold a fetus is a child under child abuse or
endangerment statutes. 177 The majority believed other states' deci-
sions were inapplicable since they had "entirely different bodies of
case law from South Carolina."'1 78 The only state that Whitner felt was
relevant to the discussion was Massachusetts, which recognizes rights
of fetuses in civil and criminal homicide contexts. 179 Nevertheless, the
majority distinguished a Massachusetts court's refusal to expand a
statute prohibiting delivery of cocaine to a minor to cover prenatal
drug use.' 80 The Whitner court determined that Massachusetts's prior
expansion of the definition of a child to include a fetus was to vindi-
cate the parents' interest, not the right of the fetus per se. 181 Con-
versely, South Carolina's earlier recognition of fetal rights was based
upon "the meaning of 'person' as understood in the light of existing
173. Id. at 781-82.
174. Id. at 782.
175. Id. The court was apparently unconcerned that, as the state's supreme court, its holdings
are binding in future lower court decisions.
176. Id. (citations omitted). Significantly, the court did acknowledge that "the precise effects
of maternal crack use during pregnancy are somewhat unclear." Id. The majority did not ex-
plore whether the same "public knowledge" could be imputed to women who smoke and drink,
because warning labels are affixed to cigarette packs and bottles of alcohol. One of the warnings
that must be affixed to cigarette packages is: "Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight." 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994). Begin-
ning in 1989, alcoholic beverages were required to include a warning on their labels reading, in
pertinent part: "According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages
during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects." Alcoholic Beverages to Get Danger La-
bel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1989, § 1, at 38.
177. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 782.
178. Id. (citing Kentucky and California as examples of states which have not considered a
fetus as a "person" or "human being" for the purposes of homicide statutes).
179. Id. at 782-83; see supra notes 158-63 (discussing pre-Whitner fetal rights in South
Carolina).
180. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783.
181. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 1990)).
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medical knowledge, rather than based on any policy of protecting the
relationship between mother and child."'1 82 Moreover, the majority
indicated that the decision in State v. Home,183 recognizing the crime
of feticide, "also rested on the State's-not the mother's-interest in
vindicating the life of the viable fetus."'184 The State's interest was
important to the Whitner court, because if only the mother's interest
mattered, "there would be no basis for prosecuting a mother who kills
her viable fetus by stabbing it, by shooting it, or by other such means,
yet a third party could be prosecuted for the very same acts."'1 85
The majority then discussed Whitner's assertion that this ruling was
inconsistent with Doe v. Clark,186 which held that a "child" for the
purposes of the Adoption Act 187 is a "child in being and not a fe-
tus,"'1 88 meaning that women cannot give consent to an adoption while
they are pregnant. 18 9 The birth mother in Doe changed her mind
about giving up her child for adoption and sought to have her earlier
consent nullified. 190 In voiding the adoption agreement, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina determined that "the Adoption Act implicitly
contemplates that consent apply to a child in being." 191 This implicit
definition was discovered by "viewing the statutory language as a
whole," which made a contrary reading impracticable. 192
182. Id. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,162 (1973) (noting that fetal rights under wrongful
death statutes "vindicate the parents' interest and [are] thus consistent with the view that the
fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life" and that "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense").
183. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
184. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783 (emphasis added). The court did not indicate why this sup-
ports the argument that South Carolina's law is distinguishable from the law in Massachusetts,
because as the court noted earlier, Massachusetts also recognized the crime of feticide. Id. at
782.
185. Id. at 783. Whitner did not explore the experiences of other states, where legislation
makes such an outcome possible. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (West 1997) (Intentional
homocide of an unborn child) ("'[A] person' [who can be charged with this crime] shall not
include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed."). Presumably, states like Illinois
have not had significant problems with women shooting or stabbing themselves in the abdomen
in response to this immunity from prosecution.
186. 457 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1995).
187. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1690, 20-7-1700 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
188. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783 (citing Doe, 457 S.E.2d at 337); see also Adoption Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1690, 20-7-1700.
189. Whither, 492 S.E.2d at 738.
190. Doe, 457 S.E.2d at 336-37.
191. Id. at 337 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690).
192. Id. The relevant provisions included: the relinquishment form's requirements that the
date of birth, race, sex, and name of the adoptee be given; the mandate that consent be given by
"the mother of a child born when the mother was not married;" and the definition of a "child" as
"any person under 18 years of age." Id; see also Whitter, 492 S.E.2d at 784.
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Finally, Whitner addressed the defendant's claim that the majority's
reading of the child abuse and endangerment statute was unconstitu-
tional because it provided no notice and violated her right of repro-
ductive privacy. 193 The court imputed notice to Whitner for two
reasons: (1) the statute's "plain meaning" includes a fetus in the defi-
nition of a child;194 and (2) "it is common knowledge that use of co-
caine during pregnancy can harm the viable unborn child."'195
The majority then discussed the holding's burden on Whitner's right
of reproductive privacy.196 Whitner maintained that the United States
Supreme Court, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,197 held
that "the Constitution protects women from measures penalizing
them for choosing to carry their pregnancies to term.' 98 In LaFleur,
a school system had a policy of requiring teachers to take maternity
leave four or five months before their due dates and not to return to
work until the beginning of the semester after their babies were three
months old.' 99 The Supreme Court held that "overly restrictive ma-
ternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise
of... protected freedoms." 200 Whitner asserted that the possibility of
serving time in prison for giving birth to her child was even more of a
burden on her right of reproductive freedom than the teachers faced
in LaFleur.201 After examining the respective interests of the govern-
ment and the burdened individuals in the two cases, however, the ma-
jority concluded that LaFleur was wholly distinguishable. 20 2 First,
relying on the Supreme Court's holdings in abortion cases, the
Whither court determined that the state has a compelling interest in
the life and health of a fetus.20 3 The court did not define the level of
193. Whither, 492 S.E.2d at 784-85.
194. Id. at 785.
195. Id. (commenting that such notice is "all the notice the Constitution requires"). The court
did not indicate how the "plain meaning" was easily determinable when no appellate court in
any state had so held; all similar definitions in South Carolina related to third-party liability; and
two members of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in this case also did not see the "plain
meaning." See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (citing People v.
Dempster, 242 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1976)) ("A person is not required, at peril of life, liberty, or
property, to speculate concerning the meaning of criminal statutes.").
196. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785.
197. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
198. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785.
199. Id. (citing LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 634-35).
200. Id. (citing LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640).
201. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 785.
202. Id. at 785-86.
203. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)).
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state interest in LaFleur, but presumably it was not similarly
compelling.
Second, the court analyzed the different interests claimed by
Whitner and the plaintiffs in LaFleur.20 4 The majority concluded that
the only right Whitner could possibly claim is the right to use crack
cocaine while pregnant, which is plainly not a constitutionally pro-
tected freedom. 20 5 Because the right of privacy does not protect drug
use, the court saw no reason that an additional penalty may not attach
to an already illegal act due to its effect on a fetus.2°6 Moreover, the
teachers in LaFleur were prevented from "exercising a freedom they
would have enjoyed but for their pregnancies. '207 Whitner, on the
other hand, never had a right to use cocaine in the first place, so the
statute as applied to her did not "restrict [her] freedom in any way
that it was not already restricted. '208 As a result, the state was free to
enact any penalties it wished to prevent an already illegal act from
endangering the life and health of another.20 9
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Finney Dissent
Chief Justice Finney, joined by Justice Moore, dissented, primarily
on the basis of strict statutory construction. 210 The dissent recognized
that in interpreting a penal statute, the rule of lenity requires that the
statute be "strictly construed against the State and in favor of respon-
dent. 211 The majority found no reason to apply this rule because it
had concluded that the statute was not ambiguous. 212 The dissent,
however, was persuaded that because a fetus is not considered a child
204. Id. at 786.
205. Id.
206. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) ("However, it is
inflicting intentional or wanton injury upon the child that makes the conduct criminal under the
child abuse statues, not the criminality of the conduct per se.") (emphasis in original).
207. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 786-87 (Finney, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 786 (citing State v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991)); see also Keeler v. Supe-
rior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625 (Cal. 1970) ("[I]t is clear the courts cannot go so far as to create an
offense by enlarging a statute, by inserting or deleting words, or by giving the terms used false or
unusual meanings.").
212. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 784.
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in another part of the Children's Code,213 there exists sufficient ambi-
guity to apply the rule of lenity.214
In reading the whole child abuse and endangerment statute, the dis-
sent found that the statute was not meant to protect a fetus.215 First,
the inclusion of the term "legal custody" in the statute necessarily im-
plies that the section refers to children in being, "because the concept
of legal custody is simply inapplicable to a fetus."2 16 Second, the types
of activities that the statute lists as examples of abuse or neglect can-
not be directed toward a fetus.217
The dissent further explained that the majority mistakenly relied on
earlier cases defining a fetus as a child.218 The cases cited by the ma-
jority were in "two different fields of the law, civil wrongful death and
common law feticide. '' 219 Whitner, however, was convicted under the
Children's Code, and the only two cases construing the word "child"
under the Code found that it meant a child in being.220 Chief Justice
Finney's dissent concluded that even if the prior construction of the
Children's Code did not definitively resolve the question, the earlier
decisions pointed out an ambiguity, and "it is axiomatic that the ambi-
guity must be resolved in [Whitner's] favor."'221
2. Moore Dissent
Justice Moore, who concurred with Chief Justice Finney's dissent,
wrote separately to address several other issues. 222 First, this dissent
indicated that the legislature's introduction and rejection of bills spe-
cifically aimed at the problem of prenatal drug exposure "is evidence
the child abuse and neglect statute is not intended to apply in this
instance. '223 According to Justice Moore, the difficulty of enacting
213. Id. at 786; see Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336, 337 (S.C. 1995); supra notes 186-92 (discuss-
ing the majority's reading of the Doe case).
214. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786 (Finney, C.J., dissenting) ("It would be incongruous at best to
hold the definition of 'child' in the civil context of Doe is more restrictive than it is in the crimi-
nal context we consider today.").
215. Id.
216. Id. at 787; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
217. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 787 & n.2 ("Examples include condoning delinquency, using ex-
cessive corporal punishment, committing sexual offenses against the child, and depriving her of
adequate food, clothing, shelter or education.").
218. Id. at 787.
219. Id.
220. Id. (citing State v. Montgomery, 144 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1965) (holding that the statute
criminalizing non-support applies only to children already born); Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336,
337 (S.C. 1995) (holding that the Adoption Act only applies to children in being)).
221. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 787 (citation omitted).
222. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
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specific legislation shows that the issue is very complicated and should
remain in the hands of the legislature, not the courts.22 4 Moore fur-
ther agreed with Chief Justice Finney's dissent that the child abuse
statute is at least ambiguous and sarcastically rejected the majority's
claim that the "plain meaning" of the word "child" in the statute in-
cludes a fetus.2 25
Justice Moore was also concerned that the majority's reasoning ap-
proved an unworkably vague statute and would result in litigation to
decide what behavior is prohibited: "Is a pregnant woman's failure to
obtain prenatal care unlawful? Failure to quit smoking or drinking?
* . . [T]he impact of today's decision is to render a pregnant woman
potentially criminally liable for myriad acts which the Legislature has
not seen fit to criminalize. ''2 26
This dissent next took issue with the majority's conclusion that a
parent who engages in an otherwise legal activity, such as drinking,
may be guilty of child neglect on that basis alone.22 7 The majority's
analysis did not mention that under the law prior to Whitner the par-
ent must also have committed an affirmative act of neglect or abuse to
be guilty of a crime; the parent's drinking was not in itself considered
abusive behavior. 228
Finally, Justice Moore noted the majority's failure to examine the
state's abortion statute, "[t]he only law ... that specifically regulates
the conduct of a mother toward her unborn child. '2 29 According to
the dissent, this analytical omission undermined the majority's goal of
"equal treatment of viable fetuses and children"2 30 for two reasons.
First, fetal health is not promoted by a law that does not hold a
woman criminally liable for drug use during the first six months of her
pregnancy, "the most dangerous period for the fetus."' 231 Second, the
discrepancy in sentencing under the abortion and child neglect stat-
utes is astonishing: "[A] pregnant woman now faces up to ten years in
prison for ingesting drugs during pregnancy but can have an illegal
abortion and receive only a two-year sentence for killing her viable
fetus." 232
224. Id.
225. Id. at 787-88 ("If that is the case, then why is the majority compelled to go to such great
lengths to ascertain that a 'viable fetus' is a 'child'?").
226. Id. at 788.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. (citation omitted).
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D. The Potential Expansion of Whither
Whither did not rest on a unique statutory or factual structure.233
Cornelia Whitner was charged under a standard child endangerment
law that did not specifically include fetuses as potential victims. 234
Moreover, as Whitner's dissents rightly noted, it was at best ambigu-
ous whether the legislative intent supported the majority's ruling.235
Therefore, Whitner's reasoning could spread to states that have
prosecutorial objectives and statutes like South Carolina's. This sec-
tion will use Illinois as an example of a state whose statutes and legis-
lative history may allow an activist court to follow Whitner's lead if the.
state legislature does not clarify existing laws.
1. Illinois Prosecutions
Early fetal abuse prosecutions in Illinois met with little success, 236
but prosecutors, emboldened by the Whither decision, have continued
to charge women for prenatal drug use.237 Recently, Kane County
State's Attorney David Akemann charged Cynthia Smith with invol-
untary manslaughter for delivering a stillborn baby girl because both
the baby and Smith had microscopic traces of cocaine in their bod-
ies.238 The coroner ruled the death was a homicide caused by Cynthia
Smith even though there were no deformities of the placenta or fetus,
and there were other possible causes of the child's death. 239 In spite
of this favorable ruling, the prosecutor decided not to gamble on find-
ing a court that would define a fetus as a person and amended the
charge to drug possession.240 That charge, while somewhat less con-
troversial, was still unprecedented; Smith's case was the first time any-
one had been prosecuted in Illinois for possession based solely on a
blood test, without any hard evidence.241 Drug laws are not written to
233. Whitner was charged with child endangerment for late-term cocaine ingestion. Id. at
778-79. Many other pregnant women have been charged for cocaine use under child abuse laws.
See State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (aggravated child abuse); Com-
monwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (criminal child abuse); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d
596 (Nev. 1994) (child endangerment); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (child
endangerment).
234. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779; see supra note 153.
235. See supra notes 211-17, 225 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
238. Lindsey Tanner, Laws Hazy on Pregnant Women Who Abuse Drugs, PEORIA J. STAR,
Aug. 17, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL 7673037.
239. Id. (indicating the death may have been caused or exacerbated by the fact that Smith was
40 years of age and had received no prenatal care at all during her pregnancy).
240. Id.
241. Janan Hanna, Prosecutors Aim to Halt Epidemic of Cocaine Babies, CHI. TRIB., May 5,
1997, at 1.
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criminalize the use of drugs; instead, they prohibit delivery or posses-
sion.242 Akemann explained, however, that it is logical to presume
possession through evidence of use by analogizing the evidence in this
case to blood-alcohol tests in drunken driving prosecutions.2 43 This
case has yet to go to trial, and its chances of succeeding are slim, but it
shows that the Whitner decision has rejuvenated prosecutorial efforts.
Before the Smith case, there were several publicized cases in Illinois
where the inability to prosecute raised public concerns. In 1989, Me-
lanie Green was the first pregnant woman in the nation charged with
manslaughter due to drug use when her two-day old baby died after
being exposed to cocaine in utero.2 44 The grand jury refused to indict,
and the prosecutor complained that if such children are born alive, the
courts have the power to order treatment and/or take custody of the
children, but if the babies die, no statutory recourse is available.2 45
Similar cases in later years also failed to result in convictions. A coro-
ner's jury in 1992 recommended charges when a stillborn infant was
born with cocaine and opiates in its system, but the state's attorney
could find no law to apply in the case.2 46 In 1993, a Waukegan new-
born died after prenatal drug exposure, but his mother escaped crimi-
nal charges since no law addressed the problem.247 In two companion
cases in the fall of 1996, a coroner's jury, unable to indict two drug
using mothers for delivering stillborn babies, recommended that Illi-
nois laws be changed to allow for prosecution. 248
2. Illinois Statutes
Despite the poor rate of success of prosecutions in Illinois, state
prosecutors have made it clear that this course of action will con-
tinue.2 49 In the future, a fetal abuse prosecution could be successful if
Illinois charges a woman under a statute that is conducive to a broad
reading by an activist court. As this section demonstrates, gaps in Illi-
242. Tanner, supra note 238, at A17; see also Hanna, supra note 241, at 13 ("It is not a crime in
Illinois or anywhere else in the country for a woman to abuse her body while pregnant.").
243. Hanna, supra note 241, at 13.
244. See Patrick Reardon, Drugs and Pregnancy Debate Far from Resolved, CHI. TRIB., May
28, 1989, § 2, at 1.
245. Hanna, supra note 241, at 13.
246. Mark Butzow, Jury Links Stillbirth to Mom's Drug Habit, PEORIA J. STAR, Jan. 9,1992, at
B1, available in 1992 WL 3576356.
247. Christi Parsons, When Drug Addicted Babies Die, Is It Murder?, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1993,
at C1.
248. Christopher R. Williams, Jury: Illinois Needs Laws to Punish Abusive Mothers-to-Be, PE-
ORIA J. STAR, Oct. 24, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 6981861.
249. See supra notes 238-48.
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nois statutory construction and ambiguous legislative intent may leave
the door open to such a result.
a. Fetal Injury
In 1981, Illinois created the offense of feticide, which was defined as
"causing the death of a viable fetus without lawful justification." 250
This law was repealed in 1986, upon the creation of the separate
crimes of intentional homicide of an unborn child, voluntary man-
slaughter of an unborn child, battery of an unborn child, and aggra-
vated battery of an unborn child.251 The 1986 laws expanded the
feticide statute in two ways: first, injury short of the fetus's death was
criminalized; second, the law applied throughout pregnancy, not just
upon viability.252 The debates over the enactment of these laws cen-
tered on the constitutionality of applying the statutes before viability
and the potential use of these laws against the mother.253
As to the constitutionality of protecting a fetus, one representative
opined that the legislature was "going directly against the Supreme
Court decisions in this area" and that the statute would be found un-
constitutional upon passage.254 A supporter of the bill did not directly
respond to this potential problem, but merely stated: "I don't think
that whether our Supreme Court makes a decision that's wrong
should preempt us from... passing a law here in Illinois that we think
is right." 255 The representative added: "I think we're seeing some
changes in the structure of our Supreme Court and subsequently, we'll
see some more intelligent decisions. '2 .56 These comments seem to in-
dicate a lack of concern with the constitutionality of state interference
in the first three months of pregnancy.
Other statements made during the House debates also left open the
question of whether the mother could be criminally liable for harm to
her fetus. The primary backer of the bill indicated in no uncertain
terms that the bill "does not apply to the mother involved" and that it
is aimed at third parties who knowingly attack pregnant women,
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 9-1.1 (1985) (repealed 1986).
251. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (Battery of an unborn child); id.
5/12-4.4 (Aggravated battery of an unborn child). The other offenses were incorporated into the
preexisting murder statute. Id. 5/9-1.
252. See, e.g., id. 5/12-3.1 ("'[U]nborn child' shall mean any individual of the human species
from fertilization until birth ...."); id. 5/12-4.4 (Intentional homicide of an unborn child); id. 5/9-
2.1 (Voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child).
253. See infra notes 254-62.
254. 84 H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEB. 83 (Ill. June 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Young).
255. Id. (statement of Rep. Stephens).
256. Id. at 84.
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harming their fetuses. 257 This intent may not be completely protective
of a pregnant drug user, however, when it is examined in context.
First, the statements protecting the mother from prosecution were all
made in answer to the question of the bill's applicability to women
who obtain abortions.2 58 Second, the bill was not seen as conflicting
with abortion rights, "because what we're talking about is criminal
acts [causing harm to the fetus]. '259 Therefore, the statute is arguably
inapplicable to a pregnant woman only if she obtains a legal abortion
or otherwise engages in legal behavior. This specific intent is espe-
cially important with regard to the crime of Aggravated Battery of an
Unborn Child. Unlike the crime of Battery of an Unborn Child, Ag-
gravated Battery does not explicitly state that the mother of the fetus
may not be charged. 260
Another statement in the legislative history indicates that a
Whitner-like interpretation is possible. The sponsor pointed out that
this bill was merely an extension of the rights a fetus maintains under
tort law.261 The Supreme Court of South Carolina used a similar rea-
soning to show the logical progression of fetal rights: the right to ac-
tion in tort; the right not to be harmed by a third party; and the
Whitner creation of the right not to be harmed by the mother.262
While the Illinois law has not yet been used to prosecute any pregnant
women for fetal abuse, the possibility exists as it is currently written.
b. Bodily Harm, Child Abuse, and Child Endangerment
Illinois has a number of different statutes that criminalize the inflic-
tion of various forms of bodily harm.263 With the exception of the
statutes discussed in the previous section, these laws are not specifi-
cally aimed at harm to fetuses, as opposed to living persons. Two of
these harm statutes are written broadly enough, however, that an ac-
tivist court could use them to apply to fetal abuse. First, Illinois's law
against Drug Induced Infliction of Great Bodily Harm makes it a
Class 1 felony if one unlawfully delivers a controlled substance to an-
257. Id. at 81 (statement of Rep. Pullen).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 84.
260. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.1 (West 1993) (Battery of an unborn child) (The
"'person' [who commits battery of an unborn child] shall not include the pregnant woman whose
child is harmed."), with id. 5/12-4.4 (Aggravated battery of an unborn child) (lacking any preclu-
sion of the mother's prosecution). It is unclear whether this anomaly is intentional or is the
result of sloppy statutory drafting.
261. 84 S. TRANSCRIP-ION DEn. 76 (Il1. May 13, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lemke); see also 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (West 1993) (allowing a cause of action for wrongful death of a fetus).
262. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
263. See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12 (Bodily Harm).
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other and the other person experiences great bodily harm as a re-
sult.264 This law is quite similar to the Delivery of a Controlled
Substance to a Minor statutes that have been used in other states as
the basis for fetal abuse prosecutions. 265 Using the same rationale, the
Illinois law could apply to the involuntary delivery of drugs from the
mother to the infant during the moments after birth before the umbili-
cal cord has been severed. While the law has not been used in this
way, nothing in the statute precludes such a reading.
The Reckless Conduct statute 266 is another law that could be used
to apply to fetal abuse under an expansive interpretation. The law
makes one liable if her reckless acts "cause[ ] bodily harm to or endan-
ger[ ] the bodily safety of an individual by any means. '2 67 If a court
defined a fetus as an individual for this statute's purposes, a pregnant
woman could be prosecuted for reckless conduct if she ingested any
drug, even if her acts did not actually harm her child.
Illinois laws against child abuse and endangerment, as currently
written, could also be read to include fetal abuse. Under the Abused
and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 268 the definition of "neglected
child" includes a newborn who has tested positive for controlled sub-
stances.269 While this statute was intended to give the Department of
Children and Family Services the power to remove such children from
their mothers' custody, 270 no provision in the statute prevents the de-
partment from sharing its information regarding neglected children
with prosecutorial authorities.
The Illinois child endangerment statute is nearly identical to the
South Carolina statute used to prosecute Cornelia Whitner.27a The
statute very broadly prohibits a person from causing the life or health
of a child to be endangered.27 2 Therefore, if an Illinois court defines a
fetus as a child for the purposes of the statute, a pregnant woman
could be prosecuted for drug use as well as any other activity that
could endanger her child's health.
264. Id. 5/12-4.7.
265. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
266. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5.
267. Id. (emphasis added).
268. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
269. Id.
270. The bill was suggested by the DuPage County State's Attorney as a way for the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") to provide assistance. See 86 S. TRANSCRIP-
TION DEB. 178 (Ill. June 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Topinka). There was no explanation of why
the state's attorney would have such an interest in DCFS's activities or whether the state's attor-
ney had any personal interest in the amended definition.
271. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21.6; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
272. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21.6.
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FETAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
Most courts faced with fetal abuse prosecutions have recognized the
constitutional problems of notice and vagueness when a woman is
charged under child abuse or drug delivery statutes. 273 These courts
determined that a plain reading of the statutory language shows that
they were not intended to apply to fetal abuse, so no reasonable
woman would be aware that her behavior would subject her to crimi-
nal charges. 274 Because previous cases were decided on statutory in-
terpretation alone,2 75 and no legislation specifically addressing fetal
abuse has been challenged to date, courts have avoided more lengthy
analysis of the constitutionality of fetal abuse prosecutions in general.
Several constitutional issues are implicated when a woman is
charged with abusing her fetus under any type of statute. Whitner,276
the only appellate-level court to uphold a conviction for fetal abuse,
very quickly dismissed the constitutional arguments made by the de-
fendant.2 77 The constitutionality of the crime of fetal abuse, however,
deserves a much more detailed and thoughtful consideration than that
court was willing to give. This Part will give an overview of some of
the constitutional problems that should be examined before allowing
prosecutions to continue.278
A. Reconciling Fetal Abuse Prosecutions with the Right of
Reproductive Privacy
Any law that punishes a pregnant woman for behavior that affects
her fetus must be examined in light of the United States Supreme
Court's rulings in abortion cases.279 These decisions are the Court's
only statements about a pregnant woman's obligations to her unborn
child and the government's interest in the fetus's life and health. Fur-
thermore, all laws purporting to vindicate the interests of a fetus in-
volve the same conflict between the mother's and the fetus's rights. 280
273. See supra notes 41-42 and 49-51 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 41-42 and 49-51 and accompanying text.
275. Roberts, supra note 4, at 940.
276. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997); see supra Part II.
277. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 784-86.
278. But see Solomon, supra note 21, at 424-27 (arguing that constitutional law will not guar-
antee a pregnant woman's rights due to: the unpredictable and inconsistent application of the
law; the constantly changing face of the law; and the misconceptualization of the issue into sepa-
rate fetal and maternal interests to be balanced).
279. These cases include Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
280. See Ann Treneman, Just Imagine if James Kelly Had Won.... INDEPENDENT (London),
June 1, 1997, (Features), at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File ("The power of the
idea of foetal [sic] rights is that it is at the heart of the abortion issue but is also much wider. It
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Fetal abuse prosecutions must, therefore, be examined in light of: (1)
the constitutional privacy interest;281 (2) the relative strength of the
woman's and the state's interests in each trimester;282 and (3) the un-
due burden test recently promulgated by the Court.2 83
1. The Right of Privacy
The constitutional right of procreation was first pronounced by the
Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma.284 The case involved a challenge to
the practice of mandatory sterilization of persons convicted three
times of felonies showing "moral turpitude. 128 5 The Court held the
practice to be unconstitutional, stating: "Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. 2816 It
is significant that the challengers here were felons, not society's ideal
potential parents, yet the Court chose this case to acknowledge a uni-
versal right of procreation. Skinner was a dramatic change from the
Court's earlier stance, which upheld forced sterilization of "mental de-
fectives" because, in the inimitable words of Justice Holmes: "Three
generations of imbeciles are enough. s28 7
Basing its decision partly on the rule in Skinner, the Supreme Court
announced in Griswold v. Connecticut 88 that a "penumbra" of rights,
including the rights to marry and procreate, imply a constitutional
right of privacy that extends to reproductive decisions. 289 The chal-
lengers in Griswold had been convicted of giving advice to married
couples about birth control, in violation of state law prohibiting con-
traception.2 90 A much more difficult set of facts was presented in Ei-
senstadt v. Baird,291 where the challenger to a birth control law
encompasses everything from a woman's behaviour during pregnancy to her decisions surround-
ing the birth (whether to have a Caesarean, for example), surrogacy, infertility treatments, foetal
[sic] surgery and much more."); see also KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD 194 (1984) (arguing that the abortion debate is not truly about fetal rights but
instead is "actually about the meanings of women's lives").
281. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
282. Id. at 162-64.
283. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (developing the undue
burden test).
284. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
285. Id. at 536.
286. Id. at 541.
287. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.").
288. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
289. Id. at 483-86.
290. Id. at 480.
291. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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distributed contraceptives to an unmarried woman.2 92 The Court held
that the general right of privacy in reproductive decisions must be
equally applicable to the married and unmarried. 293 In Roe v.
Wade,294 the Court held that this right of privacy was "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. ' 295 The Roe decision was based, in part, on the Court's
concern with the psychological trauma that may accompany an un-
wanted pregnancy.2 96
While it has never been explicitly stated by the Court, it logically
follows that if a woman's reproductive privacy right extends to her
decisions about contraception and abortion, that right should also en-
compass privacy surrounding her health during the pregnancy as well
as the fact of pregnancy itself. Moreover, a woman should be able to
maintain some insulation from governmental interference if her preg-
nancy is spontaneously terminated.297 Mandatory reporting laws,
however, may contravene the privacy right. These statutes allow a
physician to administer drug tests to women he or she suspects of sub-
stance use,298 and the statutes require reporting of positive tests to
governmental authorities.2 99 Thus, a woman may be subjected to pub-
lic exposure of her pregnancy if her physician reports his or her find-
ings or suspicions. Such publicity may not be troublesome for all
women; some, however, may have important reasons to keep their
pregnancies secret.300 Moreover, the underlying condition that ex-
292. Id. at 440 & n.1.
293. Id. at 453 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
294. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
295. Id. at 153.
296. Id. (noting "[t]he detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether" includes "a distressful life and future," "[p]sychological harm,"
and "continuing stigma").
297. See Lynn Paltrow, "Fetal Abuse": Should We Recognize it as a Crime?, 75 A.B.A. J., Aug.
1989, at 39 (noting that every woman who has a miscarriage or stillbirth could be called to
defend her prenatal practices, which would be an invasion of privacy at an emotionally devastat-
ing time).
298. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (requiring that physi-
cians test all women in their care who are pregnant or have given birth within eight hours, and
who exhibit "obstetrical complications" that indicate possible use of a controlled substance).
299. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (mandating that physicians immediately report to
the local welfare agency any pregnant woman they "know[] or ha[ve] reason to believe" has
used a controlled substance).
300. For example, domestic abuse may begin or become more violent if the woman is preg-
nant. Possible reasons for the increased violence include the financial strain of a new child, the
father suspects the child is not his, or he is angry at the woman for not taking care of herself.
Shari Roan, A Dirty Secret: Society Would Like to Think That All Expectant Moms are Cher-
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poses women to criminal charges, drug addiction, is not itself criminal
behavior but a disease that is generally held to be confidential under
the doctor-patient privilege. 301
2. Fetal Rights and the Viability Line
Roe established that the competing interests of the state and the
mother must be carefully balanced in the area of reproductive free-
dom.30 2 The Court determined that the strength of the relative inter-
ests of the mother and the state vary with the trimester of the
pregnancy. 303 During the first three months, the mother's interest in
privacy outweighs the state's interest in the mother's and the potential
child's life and health, thus rendering governmental interference in
the abortion decision impermissible. 30 4 In the second trimester, the
heightened risk of the abortion procedure increases the government's
interest in the mother's health; therefore, medical regulation of the
procedure is permissible. 30 5 The government does not yet have an in-
terest in the potential life of the fetus, however, so abortion during the
second trimester presumably may not be outlawed.30 6 In the final tri-
mester of pregnancy, when a fetus is medically viable, the government
ished, But Pregnancy May Start-or Increase-Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at
El.
301. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (citing Linder v. United States, 268
U.S. 5, 18 (1925)) (holding that drug addiction is an illness, not a crime); see also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV
175-272 (1994) (categorizing drug addiction as a disease). Alcohol and drug abuse confidential-
ity statutes were rewritten in 1986 to allow disclosures of patient records in conjunction with
state child abuse or neglect laws. Renee M. Popovits, Criminalization of Pregnant Substance
Abusers: A Health Care Perspective, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 169, 176 (1991).
302. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). But see Lencewicz, supra note 16, at 604
(arguing that the categorization of the debate into "maternal rights" and "fetal rights" camps is
too narrow and that the interdependence of the relationship calls for a solution that merges both
medical and legal rights and perspectives).
303. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The Court's reliance on a trimester framework was primarily
due to the state of medical technology at the time the case was decided. Id. Fetal viability was
generally fixed at the end of the sixth month of pregnancy. Id. The Court thus established that
month as the beginning of the government's "compelling" interest in the future life of the fetus.
Id. The actual date of viability is variable, depending upon technological advances and the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. See Weinberg, supra note 97, at 540 n.96. A plurality of the
Court subsequently rejected the trimester framework, claiming that the government has a com-
pelling interest throughout pregnancy. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
The Casey court did agree, however, that the government may not block the right to choose
abortion until viability. Id. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, the first two trimesters
under Roe will be considered equivalent to the pre-viability stage under Casey.
304. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
305. Id. (holding that any state regulation at this point must relate solely to the health of the
mother, not that of the unborn child).
306. Id.
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finally has a sufficient interest in the child's well being and can strictly
regulate abortions, even allowing only those abortions which are med-
ically necessary for the mother's life and health.30 7
The relative weight given to the interests of the pregnant woman,
the fetus, and the state, before and after viability, is problematic for
those who wish to prosecute pregnant women for child abuse. Some
commentators have argued that although a woman can abort during
the first two trimesters, once she has decided to keep the baby, the
goal of the child's health should outweigh her interests, and the
mother has a "legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world as
healthy as is reasonably possible. ' 30 8 This argument, however morally
compelling, does not resolve the issue. Although a woman may make
an early decision to keep her child, and though using drugs during the
first two trimesters can do significant damage,30 9 the state cannot es-
tablish an interest sufficient to prosecute the pregnant woman during
this period of time. It would be incongruous if the state had no power
to prosecute a woman for terminating her pregnancy but could charge
her with fetal abuse if she does not abort. Thus, drug use should never
be considered fetal abuse until the third trimester of pregnancy. 310
Three important issues are implicated by this fact. First, if drug use
during the third trimester is automatically considered fetal abuse, a
state should be able to prosecute the mother at that time, before the
child is born. The government's interests during this period, however,
are primarily in the potential life and health of the unborn child.311
Thus, the state interest in intervention is necessarily restricted if the
mother's activities do not harm her child. Current medical technol-
ogy, however, cannot detect a child's injury due to drug exposure
307. Id. at 163-64.
308. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 438 (1983). "Conflicts over management of the pregnancy arise
only after she has decided to become or remain pregnant. Once she decides to forgo abortion
and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to act in ways that would
adversely affect the fetus." Id. at 437 (citations omitted); see generally Grace, supra note 61
(arguing that a woman who chooses to proceed with a pregnancy is obligated to act reasonably
regarding the child's health and tacitly agrees to state intervention if she does not do so).
309. Medical evidence suggests that the majority of neurological injury inflicted upon a fetus
occurs during the third through eighth week of pregnancy, before many women are even aware
that they are pregnant. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy:
Perinatal Outcome, 261 JAMA 1741, 1742 (1989).
310. See Popovits, supra note 301, at 177; cf. Best, supra note 21, at 210-11 ("It is simply
unnecessary, under the existing state of constitutional analysis, to decide whether or not a fetus
is a person or even to utilize a viability standard to determine when a state may intervene to
protect a fetus. Casey clearly held that a state has a legitimate interest in the protection of a
fetus from the outset of pregnancy."); infra Part III.A.3.
311. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65.
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before the child is born.312 As a result, women may be prosecuted for
abuse before the stated crime can be proven.313
Second, there are practical difficulties in prosecuting for third-tri-
mester abuse. Because the precise amount of third-trimester harm
will be nearly impossible to determine, 314 statutes will necessarily have
to presume abuse from the mother's third-trimester drug use or a
newborn's positive toxicology test rather than any actual harm to the
child. Therefore, these statutes seem designed to punish women for
drug use rather than for child abuse.315 Such laws also run a tremen-
dous risk of overinclusiveness, since a woman could be charged with
child abuse whether or not her child is actually harmed.316 Finally,
these laws, which are intended to protect the fetus, may actually en-
courage women to obtain abortions. A pregnant drug user may de-
cide to have a first trimester abortion to avoid future prosecution. 317
Even subtle governmental pressure to end a pregnancy would run
afoul of the fundamental right of reproductive freedom. 318
3. The Undue Burden Test
Prosecuting women for fetal abuse is also inconsistent with Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,319 where the Supreme Court narrowed its Roe v.
312. See supra notes 79-85 for the potential effects of cocaine exposure on newborns. None of
these symptoms can be diagnosed in utero. See also supra notes 60-64 for a discussion of a case
where a woman was charged with child abuse for drinking while pregnant, but the charges were
dropped because the state could not prove injury.
313. Ironically, if the prosecutorial goal is achieved, women will remain drug-free by being
forced into treatment or prison for the remainder of their pregnancies, lessening the chance of
permanent harm to their children. A prosecution may be a complete success if a woman is
punished for abusing a perfectly healthy newborn.
314. Adams, supra note 97, at 64. The greatest risk of long-term damage occurs during the
early stages of pregnancy, when defective cells are able to rapidly divide. Id. "[T]he period of
peak susceptibility to structural abnormality lasts from days 20-55 in human pregnancy. This is
the period in which structural differentiation of major organ systems occurs, and in which target
organ formation is most susceptible to disruption." Id.
315. Drug addiction itself is not a crime. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also
Oberman, supra note 56, at 538 (noting that because these laws disregard the injurious effects of
poverty, child protection does not seem to be their true purpose).
316. See infra notes 390-98 (discussing overinclusiveness of fetal abuse prosecutions).
317. This possibility was noted by two courts that declined to uphold prosecutions for prenatal
child abuse or endangerment. See State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994); see also Weinberg, supra note 97, at 540.
318. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (warning that reproductive con-
trol could be used to "cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither
and disappear"). This admonition is especially pertinent in the context of fetal abuse laws, which
are primarily aimed at cocaine use. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the possible discrimi-
natory motivations of these prosecutions.
319. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Wade holding. 320 Casey recognized that the government has some in-
terest in the health of the fetus throughout pregnancy, not merely in
the final trimester.321 Accordingly, the Casey Court held that a state
may put restrictions upon obtaining an abortion during the first two
trimesters as long as those restrictions did not place an undue burden
upon the woman's decision whether to abort.32 2 The effect of the
Court's new definition of governmental interests in pregnancy is un-
clear. One commentator has posited:
Given that Casey has eliminated the rigid line of viability, it is argu-
able that the compelling state interest in prenatal substance abuse
could be sustained at any time during a pregnancy. This argument is
not rebutted by the holdings of Roe and Casey, which preserve a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability, since
state intervention governing prenatal substance abuse neither con-
trols nor infringes upon the substance abuser's right to an abortion.
Rather, it regulates the woman's conduct during pregnancy after she
has decided to have her child.323
It is not disputed that the decision to prosecute for fetal abuse does
not create an undue burden on the right to obtain a legal abortion. It
may be argued, however, that prosecution implicates the converse
principle, with which the Casey Court would undoubtedly agree: The
State should not place an undue burden on a mother's choice to give
birth to her child.324 Threatened prosecution constitutes an undue
burden on the decision faced by a pregnant drug user who wishes to
keep her baby. States may argue that the only burden placed on these
pregnant women is the burden to stop using drugs. The actual burden,
however, is far more intrusive into the choices these women need to
make.
First, in a state with mandatory reporting statutes and a policy of
prosecution, a drug-addicted mother is faced with the following op-
tions: (1) to go to the doctor and risk criminal charges; (2) to shun the
320. Id. at 879. The Court did reaffirm all three parts of Roe v. Wade's central holding: (1)
the woman's right to choose to have an abortion before viability; (2) the power of the state to
regulate abortions after viability; and (3) the recognition that the state has interests in the life
and health of the mother and fetus throughout the pregnancy. Id.
321. Id. at 878. The plurality opinion in Casey rejected Roe's rigid trimester framework and
allowed states to promulgate rules promoting fetal life before viability. Id.
322. Id. "An undue burden exists ... if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id.
323. Lencewicz, supra note 16, at 616.
324. The plurality made it clear that bringing the fetus to term is a valid, even the preferred,
objective. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. "[M]easures designed to advance this interest [in the fetus's
potential life] will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion." Id.
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doctor and risk the fetus's health by not getting prenatal care;325 or (3)
to terminate her pregnancy. 326 Thus, fear of prosecution not only reg-
ulates, but unduly burdens, a woman's decision whether to keep her
baby, which the Casey court determined is an impermissible restric-
tion.327 Second, a mandatory reporting requirement unduly burdens
women who do not want their pregnancies to be revealed. Casey ex-
plicitly acknowledged that a woman may have a significant interest in
privacy surrounding her pregnancy. 328 In striking down Penn-
sylvania's spousal notification law as an undue burden on the abortion
decision, the Court recognized that some women have powerful and
legitimate interests in keeping their pregnancies secret. 329 Moreover,
the Court stated that this burden is significant even if only a small
number of women would be distressed by the privacy invasion:
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured
for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose
conduct it affects .... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is
the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant. 330
The third burden on a woman's decision is the broad wording of
some of the statutes used to prosecute. The child neglect statute in
Whitner,331 for example, made it a crime to commit any act that en-
dangers or is likely to endanger the life, health, or comfort of a
child.332 This statute and others like it could be interpreted to require
mothers to refrain from all activities that are even potentially harmful
to their children. Cases indicate that this is not a mere hypothetical;
states are willing to criminally charge women for engaging in a legal
activity while pregnant.333 It would be an undue burden to require a
mother, under the penalty of imprisonment, to have the healthiest
325. See infra notes 403-09 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
327. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (holding that a governmental restriction which is unduly burden-
some is invalid).
328. Id. at 892-94.
329. Id. ("[A] significant number of women ... are likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.").
330. Id. at 894.
331. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
332. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (amended 1993 and 1996). "Any person
having the legal custody of any child ... who shall ... neglect to provide.., the proper care and
attention for such child ... , so that the life, health or comfort of such child ... is endangered or
is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... Id.
333. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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child possible.334 Prosecuting pregnant women for ingesting illicit
drugs necessarily implicates the Supreme Court's abortion decisions.
Since the rights at issue are so fundamental, it is vitally important that
a thoughtful legislature carefully reconcile all statutes used to prose-
cute with the right of reproductive privacy and freedom.
B. Fetal Abuse Prosecutions and the Equal Protection Clause
Another constitutional criticism of fetal abuse prosecutions is that
they may violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal pro-
tection.335 The Equal Protection Clause provides generally that those
who are similarly situated will be treated similarly, and those who are
not similarly situated will not be treated similarly. 336 This Part exam-
ines arguments that fetal abuse prosecutions discriminate on the basis
of gender and race and that they are unjustifiably over- and
underinclusive.
1. Gender Discrimination
If a statute discriminates on the basis of gender, the Supreme Court
applies an intermediate level of scrutiny to determine whether the law
is constitutional. 337 As described by the Court in Craig v. Boren,338
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives. '339 Fetal abuse prosecutions are obviously aimed only at
women, but that fact alone does not mean the laws discriminate on the
basis of gender, and intermediate scrutiny may not apply. The Court
has held that a classification based on biological factors, such as preg-
nancy, does not discriminate on the basis of sex, so the State must only
show that the means are rationally related to achieving a legitimate
objective. 340 In Geduldig v. Aiello,341 the Court held that a state's pol-
icy not to extend insurance benefits for pregnancy merely created the
classifications of "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons," and
334. Many of a pregnant woman's actions may affect the health of her fetus. See supra notes
95-130 and accompanying text.
335. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
336. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-1, at 1438 (2nd ed. 1988).
337. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
338. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
339. Id. at 197.
340. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
341. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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therefore did not discriminate based on sex.342 This determination
was upheld two years later in another insurance coverage case, which
also found that discrimination based on physical characteristics is not
violative of equal protection and therefore does not demand more
than a deferential standard of review.343
A summary examination of these cases seems to indicate that prose-
cuting only women for fetal abuse does not discriminate on the basis
of sex. Nevertheless, the question is not so easily resolved. The insur-
ance coverage cases do not squarely present the same problem as fetal
abuse prosecutions do. First, the Court has historically been very def-
erential to social legislation that allocates a state's limited financial
resources. 344 Laws aimed at incarcerating pregnant women, however,
cut to the very heart of one's personal liberty. As a result, the Court
could take a closer look at the actual goal of these prosecutions and
apply a somewhat higher standard of review than mere rationality.
Second, the Court's simplistic understanding of the categories of
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons" is not possible with fetal
abuse laws. The Court in Geduldig justified its reading of the catego-
rization by noting: "There is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not. ' 345 The same cannot be said for fetal
abuse prosecutions. Pregnant women are prosecuted based on their
ability to harm a fetus in utero. As explained above, studies indicate
that the father's behavior before and during pregnancy can adversely
affect the fetus's health.346 Therefore, fetal abuse laws aimed only at
the mother do not merely differentiate between those whose actions
can harm a fetus and those whose behavior has no effect. Clearly,
there exists a "risk from which men are protected and women are
not," 347 so Geduldig's rationale is misplaced in this context.
Moreover, the Court might not accept Geduldig's use of the mere
rationality test today.348 In UAW v. Johnson Controls,349 the Court
342. Id. at 496-97 & n.20 (stating that even though only women can become pregnant, "it does
not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification").
343. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
344. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 493-95 (analyzing the cost to the state of providing additional
benefits to pregnant women); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that there is
no requirement that the government subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights).
345. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
346. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
347. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
348. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 526-28 (asserting that a future challenge like Geduldig
may be evaluated with intermediate scrutiny).
349. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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struck down a policy that prevented women of childbearing age from
working in jobs that could expose them to substances that could harm
a fetus.350 Because fertility and the potential for fetal harm are com-
mon to both sexes, the law discriminated on the basis of gender, re-
quiring an intermediate level of review. 351
Assuming that prosecuting only women for fetal abuse does consti-
tute gender discrimination, the next question is whether prosecutions
would nevertheless be upheld under the intermediate level of review.
The health of newborn babies is indeed an important governmental
objective. The means that the states are using to achieve that objec-
tive, however, are not substantially related to meeting the goal. While
a perfect fit between means and ends is not required under this test, it
can be argued that criminal prosecutions do not substantially relate to
the objective of fetal health. First, as will be examined below, fetal
abuse prosecutions are alarmingly overinclusive because women are
prosecuted even though there may be no actual injury to their unborn
children.352 Second, fathers' behavior also affects the health of
newborns. As Craig implied, a statute that is overinclusive of its
targeted group yet underinclusive of members of the other gender
may not survive intermediate scrutiny.353
2. Racial Discrimination
No statute used to prosecute pregnant women for substance abuse
is racially discriminatory on its face; they are all written to apply to all
women who engage in the prohibited behavior. 354 Nevertheless, a
race-neutral statute will still be subject to strict scrutiny by the
Supreme Court "if it is discriminatory in both impact and purpose, '355
which may be true of fetal abuse laws. This subpart first shows the
disproportionate impact that fetal abuse prosecutions have on pro-
tected minorities and the possible reasons for this inequality. The sub-
part next explores the constitutionality of these prosecutions.
a. Discriminatory Effect and Purpose
The vast majority of fetal abuse prosecutions have been aimed at
poor minority women. One report discovered that of women who
350. Id. at 190-91.
351. Id. at 198-99.
352. See infra notes 390-98 and accompanying text.
353. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-03 (1976).
354. See, e.g., S.C. STAr. ANN. §20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that "[a]ny person" may
be guilty of child neglect) (emphasis added).
355. TRIBE, supra note 336, § 16-20, at 1502 (emphasis omitted).
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were prosecuted, "[e]ighty percent ... were black, Hispanic, or mem-
bers of other minorities. '356 In Charleston, South Carolina, where of-
ficials implemented a novel experiment to target pregnant drug
users,357 the only women who were prosecuted were poor members of
minority groups.358 This clearly unequal impact is the result of admin-
istrative choices made at every stage of prosecution, choices that un-
fairly target minority women as fetal abusers.
First, these laws are directed primarily at pregnant users of cocaine,
who are more likely to be poor minority women than middle-class
whites.359 Poor members of minority groups, however, are not more
likely to use drugs than anyone else is: the most widely cited study of
prenatal drug exposure found that drug use did not vary widely with
race or income.360 Those who justify fetal abuse prosecutions in the
name of fetal health have not explained the reason for targeting one
drug above all others.
The second level of discriminatory administration of fetal abuse
laws is at the next stage, where minority women are significantly more
likely to be tested for substance abuse than white women are. Stat-
utes recommending testing of pregnant women or newborns do not
require doctors to test all their patients, only those they have reason
to suspect have ingested or been exposed to a controlled substance. 361
Therefore, a doctor's biases necessarily infect the process at its earliest
stages. For example, one factor that leads doctors to test newborns
for drug exposure is a lack of prenatal care, which "correlates strongly
with race and income. ' 362 Furthermore, testing more often occurs in
public hospitals that serve poor minorities than in private facilities.363
Once a minority woman or her newborn has tested positive for a
controlled substance, the results of her test are much more likely to be
reported to governmental authorities. In fact, African-American
women are reported to the authorities almost ten times more often
356. Kolata, supra note 68, at A13; see also Solomon, supra note 21, at 418 (claiming that
"[s]ince 1987, 70% of those arrested for drug-related fetal abuse have been African-American").
357. See supra notes 68-70, 142-44 (discussing Charleston's policy and procedure).
358. See Kolata, supra note 68, at A13.
359. Chasnoff et al., supra note 9, at 1204 (finding that 7.5% of black women tested positive
for cocaine versus 1.8% of whites).
360. Id. at 1203-04 (noting also that 14.4% of white women tested positive for marijuana,
compared with 6.0% of black women); see also Roberts, supra note 4, at 947-48 (discussing the
Pinellas County study).
361. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 1997) (giving doctors discretion in initial
testing).
362. Roberts, supra note 4, at 947.
363. Id. at 946; Kolata, supra note 68, at A13.
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than white women are reported. 364 Again, this discrepancy may be
explained by the fact that public hospitals are "more likely than pri-
vate hospitals to report women whose tests show drug use. ' 365
Charleston's experience is telling: even though all doctors were given
guidelines to screen pregnant drug users and report any positive re-
sults, only poor minority women were prosecuted because "the only
doctors reporting drug use to him [the prosecutor] were from the
Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston's public
hospital. '366
b. Constitutionality
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court established the
principle that a facially neutral law may still show purposeful discrimi-
nation if it is administered in a prejudicial way. 367 In Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 368 the Court struck down a discretionary licensing ordinance
under which all 200 Chinese applicants for a laundry license had been
denied, while all but one of the 80 non-Chinese applicants were
granted licenses. 369 The Court found the ordinance's discriminatory
purpose was apparent: "The fact of this discrimination is admitted.
No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that
no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to
which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not
justified. '370
While their discriminatory application is not as mathematically
compelling as that in Yick Wo, fetal abuse laws may be similarly unjus-
tifiable. First, the focus on cocaine exposure is not warranted in the
face of scientific evidence questioning the true effects of the drug and
showing that other substances are definitively harmful.371 Second, the
incredible discrepancies in the rates of testing, reporting, and prosecu-
tion may serve to show an institutional bias against poor women of
color. Third, although white women are in fact prosecuted for fetal
abuse, one commentator has suggested that their cases are pursued in
364. Chasnoff et al., supra note 9, at 1204.
365. Kolata, supra note 68, at A13.
366. Id.
367. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
368. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
369. Id at 359, 374.
370. Id. at 374.
371. See supra notes 83-130.
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order to counter the implication of prejudicial administration of the
laws.372
Assuming these prosecutions are found to be discriminatory,
373 it is
unlikely that they could withstand strict scrutiny.374 While fetal health
is certainly a compelling governmental objective, it is clear that states
do not use the least discriminatory means available. The means are
especially unjustifiable because a less discriminatory alternative, such
as universal testing or random testing of all women, would allow states
to attain the goal at least as well or better than the current practice.
375
Furthermore, states could not use administrative convenience as an
excuse to test only certain women (poor minorities) for only certain
substances (cocaine). 376
3. Overinclusiveness and Underinclusiveness
Another equal protection objection to fetal abuse prosecutions is
that they are both over- and underinclusive. An inclusiveness prob-
lem occurs when the number of individuals bearing the "trait" a law
uses for classification purposes is more or less than the number of
people who are creating the "mischief" the law is intended to cure.
377
An underinclusive law's classification scheme includes some people
who are proper targets of a law while leaving others who create the
same harm legally unaffected. 378 An overinclusive law affects both
those who are causing the harm as well as some who should not rightly
be included in its application.379
372. Roberts, supra note 4, at 957 (claiming that a white attorney in Michigan was charged
after bias allegations were aimed at the prosecutor) (citing CYNTHIA DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S
EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS 134-35 (1993)).
373. This outcome is highly doubtful. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (accepting a city's claimed neutral motive for
a policy that was discriminatory in practice); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
that discriminatory effect alone is insufficient to show the necessary discriminatory purpose).
374. See TRIBE, supra note 336, § 16-6, at 1451-54.
375. A potential bias in testing was noted by the National Association of Public Child Welfare
Administrators, who recommended that if testing is mandated, "such testing must be universal
(i.e.[,] testing would be conducted on all pregnant women and newborns at all medical facilities
and not targeted at specific populations.)" APWA Report, supra note 71.
376. See Wengler v. Druggist's Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that administra-
tive convenience does not justify discriminatory application).
377. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 609-11 (12th ed. 1991) (describing Tuss-
man & tenBroek's "trait" v. "mischief" analysis) (citing Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroeck,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348-63 (1949)).
378. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 348-63 (1949).
379. Id.
1998] 1033
1034 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:989
Fetal abuse laws are underinclusive because they are not directed at
all people who may be responsible for the harm of fetal injury.380
First, as discussed above, fathers' behavior and ingestion of substances
can adversely affect the fetus's health, 381 but men have been immune
to prosecution. Second, these laws have been primarily used against
women who have ingested cocaine and generally do not affect women
who engage in other voluntary, harmful activities. 382 Finally, only
late-term drug use is prosecuted, 383 but early exposure creates the
most serious risk of fetal injury.384 Therefore, many who have com-
mitted "fetal abuse" are not held liable for their actions.
The fact that these laws are underinclusive, however, does not mean
the Supreme Court will invalidate them. Underinclusive laws are al-
most always upheld as long as there is some rational basis for promul-
gating the classification scheme. 385 The Court is very deferential to a
state's decision to cure a problem "one step at a time"386 and allows a
state to target only some individuals who are responsible for the harm
the law was intended to prevent. 387 Nevertheless, an argument can be
made that fetal abuse classifications are impermissibly underinclusive
by focusing solely on drug users, a disenfranchised group. 388 As Jus-
tice Jackson explained: "[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action
so effectively as to allow.., officials to pick and choose only a few to
whom they will apply legislation and thus escape the political retribu-
380. VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 459.
381. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 95-130 and accompanying text; see also VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 459
(claiming that a law intended to promote fetal health that prohibits only the use of cocaine or
other controlled substances may be unconstitutionally underinclusive).
383. If a woman uses drugs early in pregnancy, tests of the mother or baby at the time of
delivery will definitely be negative. Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 640.
Even very late-term use can go undetected; blood tests may be negative even if the woman has
taken drugs within forty-eight hours of delivery. Id.
384. From conception to day 17 or 18, cells are "very sensitive to the effects of harmful sub-
stances," and exposure may result in miscarriage. LARRY H. GOLDBERG & JOANN LEAHY, THE
DoCrORS' GUIDE TO MEDICATION DURING PREGNANCY AND LACTATION 14 (1984). During the
next phase, from 18 to 55 days' gestation, the "growing fetus is extremely sensitive to a drug's
ability to cause birth defects." Id. In the "period of growth and maturation," which occurs in the
second and third trimesters, a "growing fetus is relatively resistant to the birth-defect-causing
properties of drugs, although birth defects may still occasionally occur." Id. at 15.
385. See TRIBE, supra note 336, § 16-2, at 1440.
386. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
387. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) ("It is no require-
ment of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.").
388. See Smith, supra note 12, at El ("'It seems politically safer to go after this population."')
(quoting neonatologist Dr. Stephen Kandall).
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tion that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected." 389
Because these laws are overinclusive as well as underinclusive, they
may be more vulnerable to constitutional attack.390 The Court gives
overinclusive legislation moderately strict review, on the theory that
the law should not burden citizens without sufficient cause.391 Fetal
abuse prosecutions are overinclusive because they prosecute women
with the "trait" of prenatal drug use who have not caused the "mis-
chief" of fetal injury. The degree of fetal injury, and whether any in-
jury occurs at all, is the product of a number of factors and cannot be
determined solely on the basis of the mother's ingestion of a con-
trolled substance. As explained above, a drug-exposed newborn's
prognosis varies greatly, depending on the mother's general health
and nutrition; whether the mother uses any other substances, such as
alcohol and cigarettes; the level of prenatal care she receives;392 and
the timing of the fetus's drug exposure. 393 Women who are held liable
while they are pregnant are prosecuted well before any discernible
harm is known.394 Moreover, even women who have given birth to
"crack babies" exhibiting symptoms of drug withdrawal may be pre-
maturely charged, because a child who is brought into the world with
drugs in his or her system does not necessarily face any injury beyond
irritability and tremulousness at birth.395 Studies have shown that the
long-term outlook of drug-exposed children is significantly affected by
environmental factors not directly related to their mothers' behavior
during pregnancy.396 Therefore, at least some women who are in-
389. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
390. "The sustaining of this classification, therefore requires both the finding of sufficient
emergency to justify the imposition of a burden upon a larger class than is believed tainted with
the Mischief and the establishment of 'fair reasons' for failure to extend the operation of the law
to a wider class of potential [targets]." GUNTHER, supra note 377, at 611 (quoting Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 360 (1949)).
391. Overinclusive laws "reach out to the innocent bystander, the hapless victim of circum-
stance or association." Id. at 611-12.
392. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
394. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1997) (allowing state intervention during
pregnancy).
395. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. Some might argue that the child's discom-
fort at this time is sufficiently traumatic to be considered abuse. It would, however, be unrealis-
tic at best to include "causing a child to be irritable" in the definition of child abuse.
396. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (listing important factors such as poor nu-
trition and emotional neglect). Of course, a parent whose drug use during pregnancy continues
throughout the child's life has a greater chance of providing an unhealthy environment for the
child. Nevertheless, any such correlation is irrelevant to the present issue. Women are prose-
cuted for harming their fetuses through prenatal drug use, not for being potentially bad parents
in the future.
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cluded in a law's definition of a fetal abuser have not, in fact, harmed
their children. The defendant in Whitner,397 for example, went to jail
when her son was a healthy eight-year old.398
IV. IMPACr
Prosecuting pregnant women for not going to the doctor, for being
too old, or for smoking cigarettes may seem improbable. If Whitner is
read broadly, however, this scenario is not only possible but likely.
First, the plain wording of the statute used to convict Whitner would
criminalize those activities. Second, the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina's decision, in dicta, supported prosecuting women for legal be-
haviors that adversely affect fetuses.399 The court was aware of the
far-reaching implications of this decision and simply stated that even
though an activity is legal, it can become illegal once it potentially
harms a fetus. 4° °
Even a narrow interpretation of Whitner, one that would allow
prosecution only for use of controlled substances, will have negative
consequences. First, the decision allows judicial expansion into an
area that should rightly be retained by the legislature.40 1 The Whitner
decision eliminates state legislatures' incentive to investigate this issue
and tailor legislation that can accomplish the objective of better fetal
health without treading on constitutional ground. For example, under
Whitner, states have no reason to invest the money and effort neces-
sary to create the kinds of comprehensive programs that are recom-
mended by many major medical and child welfare groups.402
Furthermore, the continued use of criminal sanctions is more than
constitutionally and morally unwise. Prosecutions may in fact exacer-
bate the problem they intend to solve.
397. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997); see supra Part II.
398. See S.C. Court: Fetus Abuse a Crime/Mothers Can Be Prosecuted, NEWSDAY, July 17,
1996, at A18.
399. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781-82; see also Robertson, supra note 308, at 442 (arguing that
laws prohibiting pregnant women from ingesting nicotine and alcohol would be constitutional
because there is no fundamental right to use those substances). Other supporters of fetal abuse
prosecutions claim that there will not be a "pregnancy police" monitoring everything a woman
does while she is pregnant. See Patricia Bast Lyman, Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast,
July 16, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cnbcnw File (claiming that "the references to
a woman smoking a cigarette being arrested are really ridiculous").
400. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781-82.
401. See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("The Legislature is an
appropriate forum to discuss public policy, as well as the complexity of prenatal drug use, its
effect upon an infant, and its criminalization.").
402. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
1036 [Vol. 47:989
FETAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
First, mandatory reporting requirements will negatively impact the
effectiveness of prenatal care. These laws make a woman's own physi-
cian a police informant against her, lessening the chance that she will
be forthcoming with information regarding her history of drug use.40 3
Successful prenatal treatment requires that the patient trusts her doc-
tor implicitly and reveals any conditions, including drug use, that need
to be addressed early.404 An environment of mistrust in the physician-
patient relationship which makes the patient withhold information
will necessarily decrease the effectiveness of care.405 As one court ob-
served: "[M]odern public policy, not the archaic whims of the common
law, demands that doctors obey their implied promise of secrecy. '40 6
Mandatory reporting will have even more grievous consequences
than merely ineffective care. A pregnant user who is aware that her
doctor is obligated to report her condition to the authorities for crimi-
nal sanctions may be discouraged from obtaining prenatal care at
all.40 7 Such a result would be counterproductive to the asserted goal
of fetal health, because the importance of prenatal care for pregnant
drug users cannot be overstated.40 8 A woman who is using drugs or
other harmful substances has an inherently high-risk pregnancy and
requires more careful monitoring than a non-using mother.40 9 A law
in the interest of fetal health which serves as a barrier to women seek-
ing prenatal care is therefore ineffective at best, antagonistic to its
stated objectives at worst.
Furthermore, using incarceration as a method of punishing drug-
addicted mothers does not improve the fetus's health. Any amount of
prison time imposed upon pregnant drug users is contrary to the inter-
ests of the affected child, both before and after birth. First, a state
wishing to protect an unborn fetus from the unhealthy environment of
drug exposure does not improve the child's well being by sending her
403. See VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 454.
404. Untruthful medical screenings and an interviewer's biases caused by his or her dual role
may lead to faulty diagnoses. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 185.
405. Prosecution is also counterproductive because pregnant drug users will not receive treat-
ment for their chemical dependencies. American Society of Addiction Medicine, Inc., supra
note 71, at 47.
406. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
407. Women are discouraged from obtaining prenatal care both out of fear of punishment as
well as guilt and shame. Guilt and shame are factors that make addicted women less likely than
non-addicted women to obtain prenatal care under current laws. VanRaalte, supra note 3, at
456; see also Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 641 (arguing that even the threat
of civil sanctions "may discourage mothers and their infants from receiving the very medical care
and social support systems that are crucial to their treatment").
408. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
409. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 183.
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mother to prison or jail. The conditions in prison are physically haz-
ardous to both mother and baby.410 Second, if the child, once born, is
automatically considered abused or neglected based only on the evi-
dence of the mother's drug use, the child will be forced into the state
welfare system unnecessarily. 411 Most state welfare systems are
overburdened already, 412 and fetal abuse prosecutions will force a
number of children into that system413 who would not otherwise have
entered it.414
The negative impact of fetal abuse prosecutions is particularly
alarming since they simply do not work as a deterrent.415 Women who
are addicted to drugs, those at the greatest risk of harming their chil-
dren, are the least likely to be deterred by additional punishments.416
Thus, the only possible deterrent effect of these prosecutions is spe-
410. Health risks in prison include poor nutrition, lack of sanitary conditions, and mediocre
health care facilities. See VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 457. Women and their infants are also put
in jeopardy by overcrowding, exposure to disease, and a lack of fresh air and exercise. Ober-
man, supra note 56, at 535; see also Best, supra note 21, at 214-15 ("[F]ourteen out of twenty-six
prisons in one survey made no special provisions for providing pregnant inmates with special
diets or supplementary vitamins. Only a few prisons have medical care available for female
prisoners twenty-four hours a day and some do not even have contingency plans for medical
needs during the night.") (citations omitted); Law & Medicine/Board of Trustees Representa-
tive, supra note 71, at 2667 (noting that prisons are "shockingly deficient" in providing health
care to pregnant inmates).
411. A drug-addicted mother is not necessarily an unfit mother. See Oberman, supra note 56,
at 537-39; see also APWA Report, supra note 71, at 1 ("[S]ubstance abuse or the addiction of the
parent to ... drugs in itself does not constitute abuse or neglect of the child."). Moreover, even
if drug addiction automatically implies a parent is unsuitable, then fathers should also be tested
for drugs. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 538.
412. Nationwide statistics on foster care are unavailable, but it is clear that most major juris-
dictions lack sufficient foster families to meet the demand. See, e.g., APWA Report, supra note
71, at 1 (describing a 403% increase in "substance affected infants" in Illinois between 1986 and
1988, which threatens the ability of the child welfare system to provide care); Committee on
Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 640 ("Many of these [child protection] agencies are
overburdened and unprepared to deal appropriately with the potential flood of babies born to
substance-abusing mothers."). The overtaxed child welfare system is one reason that drug-ex-
posed infants have longer hospital stays. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 183.
413. The vast numbers of drug-exposed infants are not the only ones who will be unleashed
onto the system if these mothers are incarcerated; any older children in the family may go into
the child welfare system as well.
414. These children may not be leaving the best home environments, but nothing suggests that
being warehoused in a state welfare system is any more beneficial to a child. Many placement
shelters are grossly overcrowded and are havens for crime. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 527.
Moreover, drug-exposed children are more difficult to place with foster or adoptive families due
to the unproven "label" that they are impaired. Mayes et al., supra note 71, at 407.
415. See Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at 641 ("There is no evidence that
these latter [criminal] sanctions prevent in utero drug exposure or help drug-exposed children
after birth. Without strong evidence ... [that criminal involvement has any benefit] ... such
intervention is unjustifiable.").
416. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 535.
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cific deterrence. The goal of specific deterrence has a certain appeal,
particularly in the face of anecdotal evidence of women who serially
give birth to addicted children.417 At least while the mother is behind
bars, she may be unable to repeat her harmful behavior. However,
the length of specific deterrence will be limited to the length of the
prison sentence only. Without knowing how to access programs and
services that will help them overcome their patterns of behavior, these
women will likely return to their old habits upon release from
prison.418 Increasing punishment may in fact serve its goal of decreas-
ing the numbers of children born drug-exposed, but not in the way
prosecutors intended. As courts and commentators have noted, crimi-
nal sanctions may achieve this objective by giving women more incen-
tive to abort before they are arrested.419
Voluntary enrollment in treatment programs has the highest chance
of success in getting women out of the cycle of substance abuse.420
Effective treatment would be a better specific deterrent than incarcer-
ation, by working on the problem itself rather than just making it im-
possible to have children for a specified period of time. The number
of suitable treatment facilities, however, is insufficient to meet the cur-
rent demand of voluntary admissions.421 Therefore, even mandatory
treatment legislation will be ineffective unless more treatment beds
become available. 422
417. See, e.g., Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, S. 1444, 101st Cong.,
§ 3(b) (1989).
418. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 539; see also Smith, supra note 12, at E6 (citing Dr. Ira
Chasnoff, President of the Nat'l Ass'n for Families and Addiction Research and Educ.) ("Studies
have shown that when you automatically take babies away from [an addicted woman], she is
much more likely to get pregnant again, faster, with a replacement baby.").
419. See State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1991) (citing Comment, A
Response to "Cocaine Babies"-Amendment of Florida Child Abuse & Neglect Laws to Encom-
pass Infants Born Drug Dependant, 15 FLA. S. U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1987)); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885
P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994); Best, supra note 21, at 217 & n.167 ("'Some addicted women who
recognize that they will not be able to obtain adequate prenatal care or drug treatment will be
forced to turn to abortion to avoid prosecution."' (quoting Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 299 (1990))).
420. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 185.
421. Those seeking treatment usually cannot get help. "In 1989, a survey of New York City
drug treatment facilities found that 54% refuse to accept pregnant women, 67% refuse to accept
pregnant women on Medicaid, and 87% refuse to accept pregnant crack users on Medicaid."
Solomon, supra note 21, at 418 (citation omitted); see also Oberman, supra note 56, at 517 (re-
vealing a similarly unaccommodating atmosphere in Chicago treatment facilities). The lack of
agencies providing assistance is a significant problem for women who wish to help themselves.
Jennifer Johnson was prosecuted for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor after she
"tried to get treatment and was turned away." Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issue
for the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14; see Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
422. The problem results from more than just states' unwillingness to part with the money
required to open up more facilities. Another obstacle is the paucity of research into the best
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V. CONCLUSION
Prenatal drug exposure is a problem of sufficient magnitude that
some degree of state inquiry and intervention is obviously warranted.
The use of the criminal justice system to accomplish the task of reduc-
ing drug-exposed births, however, is misguided and wrong. Several
factors caution against a rash determination that criminal sanctions
against the mother are an appropriate response. Fetal abuse prosecu-
tions at least implicate, and perhaps violate, constitutionally-protected
rights of reproductive privacy and equal protection. Therefore, states
must tread lightly and ensure that any response to the problem is justi-
fiable and narrowly tailored to achieving the goal of fetal health.
States that pursue criminal prosecutions against pregnant drug users
have not given the problem of prenatal exposure the level of study it
requires and deserves.
Before deciding the correct course of action, state legislatures
should be mindful that scientific research does not support the theory
that pregnant drug addicts are per se fetal abusers. When fashioning a
remedy, a state should be aware that experts in the fields of addiction
medicine and child welfare warn that criminal penalties will exacer-
bate, not eliminate, the problem. 423 Prenatal drug exposure is an
emotional and highly complex issue. Therefore, it must be addressed
by the legislature, after careful research and thoughtful analysis, not
by an activist judiciary.
approaches to treating pregnant drug users. Committee on Substance Abuse, supra note 71, at
641. Anecdotal evidence of effective treatments exist, but no reliable data shows "whether and
which interventions within these programs actually work." Id.
423. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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